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ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Dissertation: BEATING THE DEADLINE:  Archipelagic State 
Compliance under UNCLOS Article 47 
 
Degree:   MSc 
This dissertation studies the archipelagic States’ efforts to comply with the 
submissions required in the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea 
particularly the two foremost proponents for the archipelagic principle on or before 
the 13 May 2009 deadline set by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf as well as analysing the significance of boundary delimitation for archipelagic 
States. 
 The examination made in this dissertation deals with the earliest struggles of 
both the Philippines and Indonesia that revolved around their labours to convince the 
international community to recognize the principle on archipelagos subsisting as a 
single unit whether politically or geographically; and that an archipelagic State as a 
unit includes both the land and the waters surrounding, between and connecting the 
different islands.  This covers acts performed by both States internationally in order 
to get other countries to recognize the unique make up of archipelagos as well as the 
endeavours they undertook during UNCLOS I and UNCLOS II.  Since UNCLOS I, 
either States attempted to get the matter tabled for discussion and even submitted 
proposal for articles to be incorporated in the ongoing codification of the Law of the 
Sea.  However, this ended without the issue concerning archipelagos being tabled for 
discussion because the submitted proposals were withdrawn for being too 
complicated.  This situation was repeated in UNCLOS II.  However, the proponents 
did not limit their moves only in the international arena but have already started 
acting locally in their respective States some of which even predates the law of the 
sea conferences.  These matters are discussed in the first chapters of this study. 
iv 
 Chapter Four deals specifically with the significance of boundary delimitation 
vis-à-vis the archipelagic States including its implications to present issues of 
economy, security and global warming.  This Chapter tries to examine the 
implications of compliance and that of non-compliance to a State with the prevailing 
issues mentioned in the preceding sentence. 
 The last two chapters deal with the present status relating to compliance of 
the two leading proponent States on the archipelagic principle and their individual 
efforts and contribution to the adoption of the principle until the present with the 
deadline just around the corner. 
 
KEYWORDS :   Archipelago, Archipelagic States, Archipelagic Baselines, 
Baselines, Boundary Delimitation, UNCLOS 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“The oceans had long been subject to the freedom-of-the-seas doctrine - a 
principle put forth in the seventeenth century essentially limiting national rights and 
jurisdiction over the oceans to a narrow belt of sea surrounding a nation's coastline. 
The remainder of the seas was proclaimed to be free to all and belonging to none.”1  
“Prior to the mid-20th century coastal states rarely claimed more than three nautical 
miles from the coast”2, this was then aptly called the “cannon shot rule” because the 
three nautical miles was said to be the range of a cannon during those times3.  Hence, 
baselines then were looked upon as a means of affording security and defence to the 
coastal State, more militaristic and political than economical.  Since then, there has 
been a tremendous increase in the maritime space coming under the jurisdiction of 
coastal states.4  Different maritime zones were being introduced one by one and 
eventually included in conventions.  These changes occurred more so after the 
Second World War because everyone was traumatized by their own propensity to 
destroy their fellow that States started looking for peaceful ways to mark territories 
especially because there was a steady increase in the number of newer States who 
have just gained independence from their colonizers.  The State practice was 
changing concerning the breadth of the territorial sea that by 1958, “21 nations 
claimed a 3-mile territorial sea, 17 claimed 4 to 6 miles, 13 claimed 7 to 12 miles, 
                                                            
1 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A historical perspective, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm 
(retrieved 19 July 2008). 
2 Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, 2nd Edition, 
Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005 at p.9.  
3 Douglas M. Johnston, The theory and history of ocean boundary-making. Canada: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1988 at pp. 79-80. 
4Supra footnote 2. 
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and 9 nations claimed the sea above the continental shelf for varying distances”.5  
These claims clearly poses a problem with the potential of leading to yet another 
world war that most believe it imperative to bring all these claims into one 
harmonized process.  Thus the United Nations directed the newly created 
International Law Commission to take into consideration the codification of the law 
of the sea.    
“The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea first met at Geneva 
from 24 February to 27 April 1958.  Of the eighty-six States represented there, 
seventy-nine were Members of the United Nations and seven were members of 
specialized agencies though not of the United Nations.” 6   It was in this first 
Conference for the codification of the law of the sea that the subject on archipelagos 
together with its definition and other circumstances was proposed by two Southeast 
Asian States.  “Although it was after the 1951 Judgement of the International Court 
of Justice (Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case) that Indonesia and the Philippines 
began to pursue actively their causes for the legal sanction of their archipelagic 
claims.”7  This was evident by the note verbale that the Philippine Government sent 
to the Secretary General of the United Nations in 19558 and Indonesia’s petition in 
1957.  Even so, at the end of UNCLOS I no resolution was reached nor was the 
archipelago issue discussed thoroughly because the Conference had difficulty with 
the discussion on the breadth of territorial sea.9  Due to the many unresolved issues 
left at the wake of the 1958 Conference, it was therefore natural that another 
conference was necessary.  Hence the Second Conference of the Law of the Sea was 
convened in 1960 in Geneva.  Unfortunately, the subject on mid-ocean archipelagos 
                                                            
5 S. P. Jagota, Maritime Boundaries, Vol. 9, 1985 at p.20 and see also its footnote 51. 
6 Law of the Sea: Regime of the Territorial Sea, International Law Commission, 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/8_2.htm (retrieved 19 July 2008). 
7 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, The Law of the Sea and Maritime Boundary Delimitation in South-East 
Asia, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987 at p. 152. 
8 Ibid p.153. 
9 Ram Prakash Anand, International Law and the Developing Countries: Confrontation or 
Cooperation, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987 at p. 206. 
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only incidentally arose thereto in relation to historic waters.10  The primary concerns 
of UNCLOS II were “(a) the breath of the territorial sea bordering each coastal state, 
and (b) the establishment of fishing zones by coastal states in the high seas 
contiguous to, but beyond the outer limit of the territorial seas of the coastal 
states.” 11   All the same, the issue on the status or archipelagic States was still 
broached during the Conference. 
Nevertheless, UNCLOS I and UNCLOS II left open this question, being 
preoccupied with solving what seemed insurmountable technical issues of the 
juridical nature of historic waters and the maximum breadth of the territorial sea.12  
In the meantime, the Philippines and Indonesia arduously continued to press their 
case before the international community right up to and during UNCLOS III.13
On 1 November 1967, Malta's Ambassador to the United Nations, Arvid 
Pardo, asked the nations of the world to look around them and open their eyes to a 
looming conflict that could devastate the oceans, the lifeline of man's very 
survival.14  He spoke of the Super-Power rivalry that was spreading to the oceans, 
of the pollution that was poisoning the seas, of the conflicting legal claims and 
their implications for a stable order and of the rich potential that lay on the 
seabed.15  For this reason, perceiving that a law of the sea is really imperative, the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea convened in 1973.  The 
issue on the archipelagic States and their proposal of an altogether different regime 
was still actively pursued by the proponents even until UNCLOS III.  During the 
plenary session of the Conference in Caracas in 1974, many developing nations 
lent their support to the archipelagic cause.16  This growing support that was not 
                                                            
10 Muhammad Munawwar, Ocean States: Archipelagic Regimes in the Law of the Sea, London: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995 at p.93. 
11 A.H. Dean, The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fight for the Freedom of 
the Seas, 54 American Journal of International Law, 1960 at p.752. 
12 Kittichaisaree, supra footnote 7 at p. 146. 
13 Ibid., p.153. 
14 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra footnote 1. 
15 Ibid. 
16Munawwar, supra footnote 10. 
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yet evident during UNCLOS I and II rose in number not only because of the 
support from Southeast Asian States but also due to more new States that had just 
gained independence and were trying to define their status in the international 
community.  Some of the notable additional support came from the Pacific Island 
States.  This propelled the archipelagic principle into the forefront until it was 
eventually made part of the now existing United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS).  
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 established a 
number of maritime zones, each of which varies in degree of exclusivity of rights and 
control afforded to a coastal State: internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial sea, 
contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. 17   The 
generation of different maritime zones is dependent on the establishment by State 
parties of baselines from which such zones are to be drawn.  Upon the entry into 
force of UNCLOS on 16 November 1994, State Parties had until 2004 to comply 
with the delineation of their territories as well as the different zone regimes that they 
choose to apply.  The basic process for the Party States was the delineation of their 
baselines.  It is from the baselines that States can proceed to designate a maximum of 
12 nautical miles as territorial sea, 24 nautical miles of contiguous zone and 200 
nautical miles for its exclusive economic zone.  All such measurements are measured 
from the baselines and not the preceding zones.  Normally, the choice includes 
among others, normal and straight baselines from which States can choose on the 
kind of baselines that it deems fit and best represents its interests and its geographical 
formation that will help it to establish the other zone regimes which have profound 
implications on varied aspects.  As for States claiming archipelagic status, UNCLOS 
III has provisions on archipelagic baselines which for some States most especially 
developing island-group States are viewed as a victory over the more developed 
traditional maritime countries.  
As succinctly stated by Prescott, 
                                                            
17Prescott et al., supra see footnote 2. 
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The rights coastal states have in certain maritime zones, notably 
internal waters, the territorial sea and contiguous zone, afford them 
security in the face of threats such as smuggling, illegal immigration, 
other forms of cross-border crime and, lately and ultimately, from the 
threat of terrorism and the use of military force.18   
This is why archipelagic States were anxious that they be treated 
accordingly in the provisions of the UNCLOS.  Coupled with the use 
of the different maritime zones as security buffers externally, these 
same zones or more specifically the baselines serve as a unifying 
element to States that are divided by seas.  The national maritime zones 
outlined in the UN Convention also offer profound benefits to coastal 
states in respect of resources, both living resources such as fisheries 
and non-living resources such as oil and gas.19   
Since on land resources have almost reached zenith through the continued 
increase of the human population, attention now has been given to the only other 
existing source that is in fact wider than the total land mass, the seas.  The creation of 
the different maritime zones actually seeks among others to also introduce 
equitability in the exploitation and control of the seas among all States regardless of 
size or wealth. Furthermore, the rights and responsibilities relating to national 
maritime zones as laid down in the 1982 Convention provide coastal states with 
opportunities and obligations in the sphere of ocean management made much more 
relevant with the present issue on pollution and climate change.20  This includes, but 
is not limited to, navigation, fisheries protection, conservation of living resources, 
pollution control, search and rescue and marine scientific research.21   
 
                                                            
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid 
20 Ibid., p.10. 
21 Ibid. 
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1.1  Objectives and Significance of the Study 
 
UNCLOS was finally adopted in 1982 after the longest international legislative 
drafting exercise in the whole of history.  With its entry into force on 16 November 
1994, a year after Guyana, the sixtieth State signed the Convention, State Parties 
were a given a period of ten years to comply with the delineation process.  Under 
Article 4 of Annex II of UNCLOS the deadline for the compliance of State Parties to 
the Convention is within 10 years of the entry into force for that State.22  However, 
several States have found it difficult to comply within the period provided that 
several requested the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf about the 
matter.  There were the notes verbales from the Government of Seychelles addressed 
to the Secretary-General requesting for an extension of the deadline.23  In addition, a 
position paper was submitted by the Pacific Islands Forum composed of Australia, 
Fiji, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua 
New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu.  The position paper was 
requesting extension of time, an agreement between State Parties that the 10 year 
period will not begin to run until date of adoption of the Commission’s Guidelines 
and, time should extend beyond 10 years if a State Party is unable to comply in good 
faith with the time limitation for technical reasons including lack of technical 
capacity.24  These motions made by different State Parties prompted the Commission 
to review Article 4 of Annex II and its provision for a 10 year period of compliance.  
In such review and considering the proposals put forth by those seeking extension, 
the Commission found reasonable grounds for the State Parties contentions.  The 
                                                            
22 SPLOS/73, Report of the Eleventh Meeting of State Parties, New York 14-18 May 2001, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/meeting_states_parties/SPLOS_documents.htm (retrieved 17 July 2008). 
23 SPLOS/66,  Notes verbales from the Government of Seychelles regarding the extension of the time 
period for submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Eleventh Meeting, 
New York, 14-18 May 2001, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/meeting_states_parties/SPLOS_ 
documents.htm (retrieved 17 July 2008). 
24 SPLOS/67, Position paper on the time frame for submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf, New York, 14-18 May 2001, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/meeting_states_parties/ 
SPLOS_ documents.htm (retrieved 17 July 2008). 
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main issue recognized by the Commission is the appropriate starting date for the 
reckoning of the 10 year compliance period.  In this respect one of the factors taken 
into consideration was the fact that the election of the Commission took place in May 
1997, which is in fact three years after the entry into force of the Convention.  
Subsequently, the Commission adopted the Technical and Scientific Guidelines only 
on 13 May 1999, two years after the election of the Commission, almost five years 
after the entry into force of the Convention.  It was only after the adoption of the 
Technical and Scientific Guidelines that State Parties were given a clear idea on how 
to prepare their submissions.25  After a thorough analysis of the situation and the 
import of the dates that members were elected and guidelines adopted, an agreement 
was reached as to the date of reckoning of the 10 year period.  As has been decided 
through a general agreement, for a State for which the Convention entered into force 
before 13 May 1999, the date of commencement of the 10-year time period for 
making submissions to the Commission was May 13, 1999, which is the date of 
publication of the Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the CLCS.  This therefore 
gives a deadline of May 13, 2009 for States Parties that have ratified the Convention 
before May 13, 1999.26  With the deadline just around the corner, most States have 
already complied and submitted their boundaries to the United Nations.  However, 
there are still some that are still in the process of complying with the requirements.  
Hence, this study seeks to analyse and examine this aspect.   
Specifically, the following objects are expected to be achieved: 
1. To assess the efforts of archipelagic states that have complied with the 
provisions of UNCLOS on the delimitation of baselines; 
2. To examine the processes undertaken by the compliant archipelagic states in 
their compliance with the UNCLOS provisions; 
                                                            
25 SPLOS/73, Report of the Eleventh Meeting of State Parties, New York 14-18 May 2001, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/meeting_states_parties/SPLOS_documents.htm (retrieved 17 July 2008). 
26Table of Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATION 
ANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/table_summary_of_claims.pdf (retrieved 18 February 2008). 
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3. To evaluate the economic as well as the sovereignty implications of the 
compliance to the UNCLOS provisions; 
4. To analyze the economic and political repercussions of failure to comply with 
UNCLOS; and 
5. To propose measures and procedures for non-compliant states in complying 
with the UNCLOS. 
 
1.2  Scope and Limitation of the Study 
 
The deadline for compliance to the delineation of baselines as well as that of 
the different maritime zone by State Parties to the UNCLOS is on May 2009.  There 
are still several State Parties that have yet to submit these requirements to the 
Secretary General of the United Nations.27   More so, it is interesting to see the 
progress specifically of the archipelagic States considering that theirs is a unique and 
different kind of regime that took a long fight to be recognized.  In this regard, this 
dissertation seeks to assess the ongoing efforts, if any, by a non-compliant State 
party.   
The forerunners of the archipelagic principle as well as for the archipelagic 
baselines are Indonesia and the Philippines both of which are States in the Southeast 
Asian region.  These two States were the very first to come up with their own local 
legislation setting up their archipelagic baselines even before the adoption of 
UNCLOS in 1982.  While Indonesia is the largest archipelagic State with 17,50828 
islands and the Philippines is the second largest with an aggregate group of 7,10729 
islands.  These two are not only the forerunners in the proposal of the inclusion of 
archipelago and its unique configuration into the UNCLOS but both States were 
                                                            
27 Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos_activities/about_doalos.htm (retrieved 02 July 2008). 
28 Consulate General of the Republic of Indonesia, Los Angeles http://kjri-la.net/content/blogsection 
/7/29/ (retrieved 29 June 2008). 
29 The Official Website of the Republic of the Philippines. http://www.gov.ph/aboutphil/ (retrieved 28 
July 2008). 
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among the first to adopt and ratify the Convention.  However, what has happened to 
these two States and have they complied with the provisions in UNCLOS, are the 
questions that ultimately this dissertation is driving at.  Having been the forerunners 
to the archipelagic principle, the question may be asked whether these States have 
been able to comply or whether they have, for some reason, lagged behind. 
Studying the efforts taken by all States claiming archipelagic status is an 
enormous task that will take more time than is allotted.  For simplicity purposes, it is 
easier to take just two States representative of a compliant and a non-compliant State.  
These categories are best filled by Indonesia and the Philippines, the two forerunners 
and fervent proponents of the archipelagic principle.    
 
1.3  Methods and Areas Covered 
To achieve the objectives of this study, the methodology applied in this 
research is the qualitative approach.  Literature reviewed was academic books, 
journal articles, dissertations, theses, research papers or reports.    
Other sources such as newspaper articles, articles and texts from internet 
websites, and online libraries were also utilized. Organizational documents 
particularly of the Philippines and Indonesia were sourced to describe the methods 
and procedures of making submission with the CLCS.   
Regular electronic communication and consultation was also made with the 
Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS) of the Office of Legal 
Affairs of the United Nations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CONCEPT OF BASELINE DELIMITATION AND THE         
ARCHIPELAGIC STATES 
 
2.1  Evolution of the Archipelagic Regime in International Law  
Prior to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, there was no 
recognition of the special characteristics and consequently the particular legal rights 
and obligations of archipelagic States.30  As can be gleaned from historical writings 
about the growth of the Law of the Sea in to a single codified instrument, the whole 
process actually spanned the length of twenty four (24) years.  This period includes 
the First and Second Conferences or UNCLOS I and II.  There have been so many 
contentious issues as well as States conflicting claims and interest for which it took 
time for everyone to at least find some middle ground or compromise that more or 
less satisfies all parties involved.  The special issue of archipelagos has much more 
suffered not only rejection from the traditional maritime States but also the lack of 
interest given by most delegates to the matter except perhaps only its two major 
proponents during UNCLOS I  and UNLOS II. 31   The principal opposition at 
UNCLOS I to a special regime for archipelagos came from the major maritime 
states.32  They feared that such a regime would result in areas which had previously 
been high seas or territorial seas becoming internal waters, with the consequent loss 
of navigational rights for both their naval and commercial vessels, especially in the 
case of archipelagos such as the Bahamas, Fiji, Indonesia and the Philippines, which 
straddle important shipping routes.33  State practice with regard to the establishment 
                                                            
30 Natasha Turnquest, Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between the Commonwealth of the 
Bahamas and the United States of America: A Case Study, pp.8-10. 
31 Academie De Droit International de la Haye, Rescueil Des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague 
Academy of International Law, France: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002 at p.309. 
32 R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3rd Edition, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1999 at p. 119. 
33Ibid. 
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of straight baselines around archipelagic nations was not considered to be part of 
customary international law prior to UNCLOS.34  Until UNCLOS III these maritime 
States consistently took the view that the normal regime of islands should apply to 
mid-ocean archipelagos, thus leaving territorial sea or high-seas routes between most 
islands. 35   Such protests reflected a conflict between competing interests; 
archipelagic States, on the one hand trying to maximize their jurisdiction of maritime 
space that traditionally had been seen as part of the high seas, and the interests of 
developed countries, on the other hand, who wanted to ensure freedom of navigation 
for military and commercial purposes.36   As evinced by records of the first two 
Conferences, the traditional maritime States have been successful in their bid to 
oppose the consideration of the archipelagic principle.  In UNCLOS I and UNCLOS 
II, the principle of archipelago was not even a topic on the table for discussion37 but 
was only mentioned incidentally in the discussion on traditional waters.38  The main 
issue is that there were only two States actively campaigning in favor of it while 
those in opposition were the traditional maritime States who were not only developed 
States but also powerful ones.  These situations though have changed in the 
UNCLOS III where there was an increase of support from other developing States so 
that it was finally tabled for discussion.  Since 1958 many archipelagic States in the 
Caribbean and Indian and Pacific Oceans have become independent, and this 
increased the pressure for the adoption of a special regime for mid-ocean 
archipelagos to meet the interests of archipelagic States. 39   One other major 
development that happened after the first two Conferences was the creation on 8 
August 1967 of the Association of the South-East Asian Nations better known as the 
ASEAN.40  The members of the ASEAN have their own differing claims and even 
                                                            
34 Turnquest, supra footnote 30 at p.9. 
35 Churchill et al., supra footnote 32 at p.119. 
36 Supra footnote 30 at p.10. 
37 Kittichaisaree, supra footnote 7 at pp. 152-153.  
38 Dean, supra footnote 11 at p. 752. 
39 Supra footnote 32.  
40 Association of South-East Asian Nations, History, http://www.aseansec.org/12712.htm (retrieved 
21 July 2008). 
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have overlapping territorial claims.  However, through the mechanism of the 
ASEAN, the members were able to amicably settle and agreement about their 
conflicting claims regionally and decided to support the claim put forth by the 
Philippines and Indonesia. 41   The Philippines in the 1950’s campaigned for the 
international recognition of its special geographical circumstances that in its note of 
12, December, 1955 to the Secretariat of the United Nations indicated that “The 
Position of the Philippine Government in the matter is that all waters around, 
between and connecting the different islands belonging to the Philippine 
Archipelago… are necessary appurtenances of its land territory, forming an integral 
part of the national or inland waters subject to the exclusive sovereignty of the 
Philippines”42
In the same way, Indonesia issued what is known as the Djuanda Declaration in 
December 1957, calling for the use of straight baselines joining together the 
outermost seaward points of the islands in the archipelago to outline the territorial 
limits of Indonesia including both islands and water.43  In said Declaration it stated 
that “if each of Indonesia’s component islands were to have its own territorial sea, 
the exercise of more effective control would be made extremely difficult” 
emphasizing on the importance of the archipelagic baselines to the definition of its 
nationhood.  While this declaration had no legal effect, even for Indonesia 
domestically, it generated protests from France, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Japan.44   These States were 
concerned with the effect that an archipelagic baselines that encloses all the seas 
between and around the islands of an archipelago would have on trade routes and 
maritime commerce. 
                                                            
41 Ibid. 
42 Charlotte Ku, “The Archipelagic State Concept and Regional Stability in Southeast Asia”, 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, (1991) p. 463. 
43 Phiphat Tangsubkul, ASEAN and the Law of the Sea, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1982 at p. 6.   
44 Ku, supra footnote 42 at p.12. 
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Such protests reflected a conflict between competing interests; archipelagic 
States, on the one hand trying to maximize their jurisdiction of maritime space that 
traditionally had been seen as part of the high seas, and the interests of developed 
countries, on the other hand, who wanted to ensure freedom of navigation for 
military and commercial purposes. 45   These protests and oppositions have been 
influential enough that it took time for the principle itself to even be discussed 
officially or placed on the table for discussion.  However, the proponents gained 
support from States who found themselves similarly situated that the clamor for it to 
be given the attention it needed grew.  The need for compromise and concessions in 
order to incorporate the interests of archipelagic States and other States was a major 
point in the negotiations at the United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea.46  
Several proposals and counter-proposals were submitted by different States.  The 
United Kingdom for its part submitted a mathematical formula that archipelagic 
States will follow if they are to use archipelagic baselines.  Aside from the maximum 
permissible length of baselines that differ so much from one another, there emerged 
from the British draft articles for archipelagos the mathematical formula of land to 
water ratio or the ratio of the enclosed land to the water.47  Subsequently, a balance 
was reflected in the substantive provisions of UNCLOS dealing with the definition of 
the archipelagic concept and the condition under which straight baselines can be 
constructed around an archipelagic State.48
 
2.2.  Definition of the Archipelagic State and Archipelago under International 
Law   
Without a precise definition of the term archipelago, it would be difficult to 
ascertain the number of States which would be able to take advantage of the legal 
                                                            
45 Supra footnote 30 at p.8. 
46 Ibid. p.9. 
47 Clive Ralph Symmons, The Maritime Zones of Islands in International Law, London: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1979 at p.80. 
48 Supra footnote 30 at p.9. 
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regime specifically related to archipelagic States.49  In the case of archipelagos, the 
constituent islands are considered as forming a whole and the width of territorial sea 
shall be measured from the islands most distant from the center of the archipelago.50  
In general terms, the concept of archipelagos merely refers to a grouping of islands.51   
One of the early definitions given on archipelagos was by the International 
Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case.  In relation to the unity of 
the island fringe with the mainland the Court stated “the coast of the mainland does 
not constitute, as it does in practically all countries, a clear dividing line between 
land and sea”.52  What really constitutes the Norwegian coastline is the outer line of 
the skjaergaard. 53   This skaergaard was said to constitute “a whole with the 
mainland”, and the Court noted that it is the land which confers upon the coastal 
State a right to the waters off its coasts.54  While this case specifically dealt with the 
particular circumstances of a coastal archipelago, it has been argued that the need for 
geographic cohesiveness extends to mid-ocean archipelagos as well.55  This need for 
geographic specificity plays a critical role and is arguably the basis and starting point 
for the archipelagic concept.56
Nevertheless, there is quite a marked divergence within this notion.  There are 
coastal archipelagos as noted above, mid-ocean archipelagos and archipelagos with 
one or more dominating main islands57.  Mid-ocean archipelagos usually involve the 
                                                            
49 Ibid.  
50 Derek W. Bowett, The Legal Regime of Islands in International Law, New York: Oceana 
Publications, 1979 at p. 74. 
51 D. P. O’Connell, “Mid-Ocean Archipelagos in International Law”, British Yearbook of 
International Law, 45(1971) at p. 24. 
52 Judgment of 18 December 1951, I.C.J. Reports, 1951, p.116. 
53 Ibid., pp.128, 132. 
54 Bowett, supra footnote 50. 
55 Supra footnote 10 p. 114. 
56 Supra footnote 30 at p.9. 
57 Patricia Elaine Joan Rodger,. MidOcean Archipelagos and International Law, New York: Vantage 
Press, 1981, page 4. 
14 
consolidation of the island grouping into a single unit by a system of straight 
baselines.58
As far as the UNCLOS is concerned, definition for archipelago is now 
incorporated and can be found in Article 46 which provides that it is “a group of 
islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features 
which are so closely inter- related that such islands, waters and other natural features 
form an intrinsic geographical economic and political entity or which historically 
have been regarded as such”.59  After several views and definitions as well as criteria 
proposed during the three Conferences, this single definition has been adopted by 
State Parties.  This definition though silent and does not use either term of “coastal” 
or “mid-ocean” archipelagos definitely shows that it more or less describes the later.  
According to Clive R. Symmons, the definition given in UNCLOS gave rise to 
several points: 
(i) An archipelago is deemed to include not just insular terra firma, but 
also non-insular natural formations (e.g., reefs) and the areas of the sea 
around them; as such they constructively form a single physical and 
economic entity. 
 
(ii) There must be a close interrelationship of all these features…it is 
clear that the geographical condition must be satisfied namely that the 
two or more islands must be so situated so as to be capable to being 
geographically considered as a whole unit. 
 
(iii)  The factor of historic claim is alternative to, rather than additional 
to, geographical, economic and political factors.60 
 
The essence of the archipelagic claim is that the waters between and around the 
islands that are inside the straight baselines, connecting the outermost islands of the 
archipelago, are considered national or internal waters, as is the case with waters 
landward of baselines in other circumstances.61  Where islands are grouped so as to 
                                                            
58 Supra footnote 30 at p.10. 
59 Article 46, United Nations Convention on the Law of The Sea of 1982. 
60 Symmons, supra footnote 47 at p.61. 
61 Supra footnote 10 at p.8. 
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form an archipelago, the Law of the Sea Convention provides that, in addition to any 
baselines drawn along individual islands to delimit internal waters, straight lines may 
be drawn around the outermost points of the archipelago itself (archipelagic 
baselines).62  
 
2.3  Definition of Baseline 
 
Within the context of international law, it is now established, as a general 
proposition, that a “baseline” is a boundary that separates the territorial sea from 
either the internal or archipelagic waters on the landward side63.  It is the line that 
delimits where absolute sovereignty can be exercised by a State and the reckoning 
point for the seaward delimitation of the other zones.  Yet, an archipelagic baseline 
does not just make waters landwards from it as internal waters, but it generates the 
different regime of archipelagic waters. 
The baseline is the line from which the outer limits of the territorial sea and 
other maritime zones (the contiguous zone, the exclusive fishing zone and the 
economic zone, EEZ) are measured.64  In theory, the drawing of a baseline is very 
important for the purpose of allocating coastal state jurisdiction.  As Johnston 
describes, a baseline is typically the exterior limit of internal and archipelagic waters 
as well as the interior limit of the territorial sea65.  The baseline of the territorial sea 
is also used for measuring the seaward limits of the contiguous zone, the exclusive 
economic zone, the continental shelf, and (for some coastal states) the exclusive 
fishing zone. 66   The outer limits of the territorial sea, contiguous zone and the 
economic zone are all a fixed distance from baselines established by the coastal State 
                                                            
62 Supra footnote 32 at p.50. 
63 Johnston, supra footnote 3 at p.95. 
64 Supra footnote 32 at p.31. 
65 Supra footnote 3 at p.95. 
66 Ibid. 
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that serves as the delineation between a state’s internal and territorial waters.67  The 
waters on the landward side of the baseline are known as internal waters, thus the 
baseline also forms the boundary between internal water and the territorial sea68.   
The archipelagic concept envisages the method of drawing straight baselines – 
a series of imaginary lines, between the outermost islands of an archipelago.69  The 
underlying basis of the archipelagic concept is the unity of land, water, the resources 
and the people into a single entity, a concept that finds it justification in the 
relationship between land, water and the people inhabiting the islands of the 
archipelago.70  The outer limits of an archipelagic State are determined by drawing a 
series of straight archipelagic baselines connecting the islands in accordance with 
criteria set out in Article 47.71
 
2.4  Establishing the Baseline 
 
Generally, geography greatly influences the drawing of a baseline and is the 
main consideration to be taken into account.  However, due to the diversity in coastal 
geography in different regions and the extreme divergence of many coastlines, 
ocean-boundary making, in practice, cannot be carried out using simple rules.  Some 
coastlines are of irregular natural features in the form of bays, estuaries, islands, 
islets, inlets, and rocks or of low tide elevations.  On the other hand, the existence of 
offshore installations, buoys or artificial islands further obscures the features of the 
coastline. 
Moreover historical, political, economic, security or other factors also 
influences the maritime delimitation process.  The interplay of human attitudes and 
                                                            
67 Douglas M. Johnston and Phillip M. Saunders (ed.), Ocean Boundary Making: Regional Issues and 
Developments, New York: Croom Helm, 1988, p. 19. 
68 Supra footnote 32at p.31. 
69 Supra footnote 10 at p.6.  
70 Ibid. 
71 James Crawford and Donald Rothwell, Law of the Sea in the Asian Pacific Region, Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995 at p. 271. 
17 
interest should also be considered.  Johnston further describes that “the attitude of 
coastal communities had tended to exclusivity, favouring claims to baseline 
delimitation criteria and methods that will have the effect of excluding inshore areas 
from foreign activities.”72  There were practices in the past where coastal states took 
maximum advantage of geographical features by “closing off” coastal waters like 
estuaries, bays, inlets and other semi-enclosed inshore waters that usually bear the 
closest physical, economic, or strategic connection with the shore. 
The new Law of the Sea affords vast extension of coastal states jurisdiction.  
This so-called “exclusivist” attitude prevalent historically has become a concern of 
the UNCLOS 1982.  Rules then were devised within UNCLOS to check on the abuse 
of discretion by the coastal state in the delimitation of such boundaries.    
The Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS) of the 
Office of Legal Affairs enumerates some elements which could further be taken into 
consideration in the maritime boundary delimitation process: 
•    Regional geography, including general characteristics and particular 
features of the region (ocean, semi-enclosed sea, etc.); 
•    Configurations of the coast, including adjacency of oppositeness, direction, 
comparative lengths; concave or convex shape; 
•    Basepoints, including presence of ports, roadsteads, bays, river mouths, 
island, low-tide elevations, reefs and their situation in relation to the coast; 
and 
•    Presence of islands and rocks. 
 
 
 
                                                            
72 Supra footnote 32 at p.104. 
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2.5  Features of the Modern Approach to Baseline Delimitation 
 
The rules contained in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea are not 
much different from those proposed by the ILC in the 1950s and formally adopted at 
UNCLOS 1.  At least four features of the modern approach to baseline delineation 
are clearly post-classical in origin, such as:73
Firstly, most of these boundary-making issues have been resolved to 
the advantage of the coastal state.  Either the rules have been 
developed in such a way as to permit the coastal state to exclude larger 
areas of inshore water, in accordance with the general expansion of 
coastal state jurisdiction, or the interpretation of these rules has been 
left to the discretion of the coastal authorities.  The treatment of 
archipelagic states is the most spectacular example of generosity 
accorded to the geographically favoured, but in a more modest degree 
most other coastal states have gained spatially from the modern 
international law of baseline delineation. 
Second, the new law of the sea has given further recognition to the 
complexities of coastal geography…  The modern regime of baseline 
delineation rejoices in the diversity of nature.  By the same token, these 
rules invite coastal states to plead uniqueness by the virtue of unusual 
coastal configurations.  
Third, these delineation rules emanating from conference diplomacy 
reflect an awareness of the actual and prospective impact of new 
technology in the coastal zone.  The provisions for artificial 
installations seem likely to encourage functionalist thinking in this 
particular sector of ocean boundary-making. 
Finally, some of the seemingly traditional rules, such as that of the 
low-water mark, have been retained, but with a new awareness of the 
need for a higher order or precision in their application, through a 
clarification of the technical choices available in tidal datum. 
 
2.6  The Archipelagic Baseline 
The concept of a special regime for archipelagic states is considered one of the 
most remarkable features of the 1982 UNCLOS.  Article 46 defines archipelagic 
                                                            
73 Ibid., p.104. 
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state as “a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include 
other islands.”74   
As of 24 October 2007, the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea 
(DOALOS), Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations published a bulletin 
indicating, among others, that there are some twenty States (Antigua and Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Cape Verde, Comoros, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Indonesia, Jamaica, 
Kiribati, Maldives, Marshal Islands, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu) that have formally claimed archipelagic status by 
enacting appropriate legislation.75    They are thereby entitled to draw archipelagic 
baselines in accordance with a formula designed especially for their benefit. 
It could be noted that paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 set out several requirements which 
the archipelagic baselines must satisfy – it must include the main islands; it must 
enclose an area of sea at least as large as the area of enclosed land but no more than 
nine times that of the land area; no archipelagic baseline may exceed 100 nautical 
miles in length, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing 
any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical 
miles; and it must not depart to any appreciable extend from the general 
configuration of the archipelago.76
                                                            
74 United Nations Conention on the Law of the Sea of 1982. 
75http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/table_summary_of_claim
s.pdf. 
76 Department of Ocean Affairs for the Law of the Sea, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_ 
agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm (retieved 08 August 2008) 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
MEASURES AND PROCEDURES FOR ARCHIPELAGIC 
STATES’ COMPLIANCE TO UNCLOS 
 
3.1  Drawing of Archipelagic Straight Baselines  
Article 47 of UNCLOS enumerates several precise and objective tests that a 
State must satisfy before it can draw archipelagic straight baselines.77  Article 47 
states: 
1.  An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines 
joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs 
of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the 
main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to 
the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1. 
2.   The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, 
except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing 
any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 
125 nautical miles. 
3.  The drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable 
extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. 
4.   Such baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, 
unless lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above 
sea level have been built on them or where a low-tide elevation is 
situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the 
territorial sea from the nearest island. 
5.   The system of such baselines shall not be applied by an 
archipelagic State in such a manner as to cut off from the high seas or 
the exclusive economic zone the territorial sea of another State. 
                                                            
77 Supra footnote 30 at p.13. 
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6.   If a part of the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State lies 
between two parts of an immediately adjacent neighbouring State, 
existing rights and all other legitimate interests which the latter State 
has traditionally exercised in such waters and all rights stipulated by 
agreement between those States shall continue and be respected. 
7.   For the purpose of computing the ratio of water to land under 
paragraph l, land areas may include waters lying within the fringing 
reefs of islands and atolls, including that part of a steep-sided oceanic 
plateau which is enclosed or nearly enclosed by a chain of limestone 
islands and drying reefs lying on the perimeter of the plateau. 
8.   The baselines drawn in accordance with this article shall be shown 
on charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position. 
Alternatively, lists of geographical coordinates of points, specifying 
the geodetic datum, may be substituted. 
9.   The archipelagic State shall give due publicity to such charts or 
lists of geographical coordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such 
chart or list with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.78
Careful reading of the text of Article 47 will show that the requirements 
provided for in these provisions are strict and can be difficult to satisfy for a State 
planning to use archipelagic baselines.  Paragraph 1, provides among others that “an 
archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost 
points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago …”79  A “drying 
reef” is that part of a reef which is above water at low tide but is submerged at high 
tide.80  Article 47, paragraph 1, also stipulates that archipelagic baselines should be 
drawn in such a way as to include all the main islands of the archipelago within the 
archipelagic baselines, though the concept of “main” is rather vague and needs an 
objective test which will clearly determine what this term truly means.81  UNCLOS 
left out what it meant or wanted the term “main islands” to mean because such term 
can be taken to mean as “geographically” large islands or politically considered 
                                                            
78 Article 47, UNCLOS 1982. 
79 UNCLOS 1982. 
80 Myron H. Nordquist, Shabtai Rossene and Satya N. Nandan (ed.), United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Boston:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985 p. 430. 
81 Supra footnote 30. 
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“main” islands.   The concept of what constitute a main island has been described in 
the following terms: “main islands might mean the largest islands, the most populous 
islands, the most economically productive islands or the islands which are pre-
eminent in an historical or cultural sense”. 82   The majority of the mid-ocean 
archipelagic States, including Indonesia, the Philippines, Trinidad and Tobago, the 
Maldives and Antigua and Barbuda have all been able to incorporate the “main” 
island when drawing their respective baseline.83
 
3.2  Water to Land Ratio  
The requirement in paragraph 1 of Article 47 has already caused States to be 
disqualified because they exceed the land to water ratio as specified in the provision.  
As stated above, “an archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines 
joining the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that 
within such baselines … an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the 
area of the land, including atolls, is between 1:1 and 9:1.”84  Only a State meeting 
those conditions qualifies for recognition as an archipelagic State and that excludes 
an archipelago belonging to a continental State and forming an integral part of its 
territory, a fringe of islands and similar geographical features.85  Hence the question 
of such far flung or seemingly isolated islands would, in practice be determined, by 
the criteria of the water land ratio and the permitted maximum length for baselines.86  
This same criteria disqualifies coastal archipelagos from claiming archipelagic State 
status. 
The Bahamas was a unique case which had long been regarded as a geological 
enigma.  The islands comprised a realm of predominantly shallow waters which were 
                                                            
82 United Nations Publication, Sales no. E. 88. V.5Baselines: An Examination of the Relevant 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, paragraph 82. 
83 Supra footnote 30. 
84 UNCLOS. 
85 Nordquist et al., supra footnote 80 at pp. 401-402. 
86 Supra footnote 10 at p. 111. 
23 
largely non-navigable except by vessels of shallow draught.87  The Bahamas banks 
present a special problem of delimitation since both the ratio of very shallow water to 
dry land area and the steepness of the slopes appeared to be unparalleled.  If those 
unique physio-geographic conditions were disregarded and conventional baselines at 
low-water level were used, bizarre effects would result.”88
The Bahamas further contended that it was constituted of more than islands and 
cays.  Bahamas intimated that the perception of the average Bahamian was that the 
Great and Little Bahama banks, which are areas of shallow water, had historically 
been regarded as part of the territory of the Bahamas.89  This connects directly to the 
sentiment held by many archipelagic nations that the land and the sea are intimately 
linked and should not be distinguished one from the other, just like Indonesia that, as 
a leading proponent of the archipelagic concept incorporated this notion in the term 
“Wawasan Nusantara” (Archipelagic Outlook). 90   This political notion basically 
refers to the concept that the land and the sea are intrinsically intertwined and is seen 
as a bridging and unifying force that connects the peoples of Indonesia. 91   The 
perception of the interconnectedness of the land and the sea may be at the heart of 
the archipelagic concept from a nationalist standpoint of island States. However, in 
international law, there is a clear distinction between what constitutes land and what 
constitutes ocean space.92  Nevertheless, States such as Indonesia and the Philippines 
are able to satisfy the land to water ratio with little difficulty given the fact that they 
are constituted by a number by large islands and several thousand smaller islands in 
close proximity with the water to ratio of Indonesia and the Philippines is 1:1.2 and 
1:1.8, respectively.93
                                                            
87 Supra footnote 30 at p. 18. 
88 Office for Ocean Affairs and Law of The Sea, Archipelagic States, Legislative History of Part IV of 
United Nations Convention on the Law of The Sea, United Nations Publication, 1990 page 46. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Supra footnote 30. 
91 Supra footnote 42 p. 465. 
92 Supra footnote 30. 
93 Supra footnote 32 at p. 123. 
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Conversely, Mauritius one of the original members of the archipelagic States 
group, can not draw a composite baseline around itself. 94   Additionally, the 
Seychelles, in the West Indian Ocean, and Tonga, in the South Pacific, are also too 
widely scattered and would not be able to enclose their archipelagos within a single 
baseline system in conformity with the maximum water to land ratio set forth in 
UNCLOS.95
The next criterion for delimitation of archipelagic baselines is found in 
Paragraph 3, which is similar to the first part of Article 47(3) that deals with straight 
baselines and it provides that it is a requirement that the archipelagic baselines shall 
not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the 
archipelago.96   Paragraph 4 deals with low-tide elevations and specifies the two 
circumstances that these may serve as base points for the archipelagic baselines.  
First, as in Article 7 (4), archipelagic baselines may be drawn to and from low-tide 
elevations if they are surmounted permanently by a lighthouse or similar installation.  
The connection of the installation could be because of the shape of the lighthouse or 
its function.  Lights are normally displayed from the tops of towers and accordingly 
if a tower has been built on a low-tide elevation, it will enable the feature to be used 
as the base point of the archipelagic baselines.  Even though the tower might have 
been built on a prison or a defensive stronghold, its eminence would alert navigators 
to avoid the shoals.  Since lighthouses warn of dangers, similar installations include 
foghorns and radar reflectors. 
Second, unlike Article 7(4), dealing with straight baselines, archipelagic 
baselines can be anchored on low-tide elevations if they lie wholly or partly within 
territorial waters measured from the nearest island.  As can be observed, when low-
tide elevations were considered, some consider that low-tide elevations lying within 
the territorial waters generated from closing lines drawn in accordance with Articles 
                                                            
94 Supra footnote 30 at p.20. 
95 Supra footnote 10 p. 131. 
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9, 10 and 11 may not be used for a further extension of the territorial waters.97  The 
words of Article 13 are explicit; low-tide elevations within 12nm of straight 
baselines (not normal baselines) may not be used to generate a territorial sea claim.  
It seems likely that this explicit rule will not be strictly observed.98  One reason is 
that the United States Supreme Court over-ruled the strict interpretation because one 
of the early drafts of Article 11 [1958 Convention] provided that all low-tide 
elevations within the territorial waters created additional territorial seas.99  It is not 
clear why the term “nearest island” is used rather than “an island.”  The latter phrase 
is used in Article 13 relating to low tide elevations.100
In reading Article 47(2) it appears to be restrictive by only allowing three per 
cent of baselines to measure between 100nm and 125nm.101  The appearance is an 
illusion because there is no restriction on the number of baseline segments that can 
be used.  Simple arithmetic demonstrates that if the number of segments does not 
exceed 33, no lines longer than 100nm can be drawn.102  Consequently, if there are 
100 segments, three baselines longer than 100nm can be drawn and if there are 234 
segments, seven lines measuring more than 100nm can be drawn, and so on and so 
forth.  With the number of lines needed to enclose an archipelago, the allowance of 
not more than three percent is sufficient enough for a State to still be considered as 
an archipelago.                                     
Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands proclaimed archipelagic baselines 
around more than one archipelago in 1978 and 1979 respectively.  The United States, 
always vigilant in protesting against breaches of baseline rules has not lodged a 
                                                            
97 Ibid.,p.173.  
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protest against the multiple delimitations.103   This is very strong support for the 
interpretation that archipelagic states can draw archipelagic baselines around all 
archipelagos that can satisfy the rules set out in Article 47.  It is interesting that Fiji 
has drawn archipelagic baselines around the main group of islands and straight 
baselines around the Island of Rotuma and its dependencies.104  This proclamation 
could be interpreted to mean that archipelagic baselines were drawn around Rotuma, 
however a later clarification noted that this was not claimed.  The view that states 
composed of two or more archipelagos may draw archipelagic baselines around them 
all if the relevant tests can be met may be used by some mainland states to justify 
their enclosure of archipelagos.  This view can be extended to suggest that if 
archipelagic states can enclose subsidiary parts of their territory by archipelagic 
baselines, then the same entitlement should be accorded to mainland states that 
possess oceanic archipelagos.  Coastal archipelagos can already be enclosed by 
straight baselines in accordance with Article 7. 
Article 47(1) is the decisive test in determining whether archipelagic states can 
draw archipelagic baselines.  Jayewardene describes the discussions that produced 
the two ratios of land to water that define archipelagic states. 105   The United 
Kingdom proposed a ratio of sea to land of 5:1 and it was decided eventually to 
select a range about that value of 1:1 to 9:1.106  The setting of the lower limit of the 
water to land ratio, the maximum length of segments and the proportion of segments 
that can be longer than 100 nautical miles appears to have been set with the 
Indonesian baseline system in mind, which was proclaimed in 1960, consisting of 
191 segments of which five segments measured more than 100 nautical miles and 
two that measures 124 nautical miles.107  However, Indonesia made changes later 
that lowered the number to 22 segments though the provision setting the required 
                                                            
103 United States Department of State, “United States Response to Excessive National Maritime 
Claims”, No.112, Washington DC. 
104 Fiji Royal Gazette Supplement, Marine Spaces Act, No. 41, 27 1981. 
105 Hiran W. Jayewardene, Regime of Islands in International Law, London: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1990 p.108. 
106 Supra footnote 2 p.174. 
107 Ibid. 
27 
length up to 100 nautical miles but not more than 125 nautical miles was already 
incorporated in the UNCLOS.  
The standard that is set in Article 47(1) has two requirements.  First, it requires 
that in drawing the straight baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost 
islands, the baselines must include the main islands.  This is seen to be, by some, as 
reminiscent of the requirement for coastal archipelagos which are not the subject of 
the regime of archipelagos.  Mid-ocean archipelagos do not necessarily always have 
main islands from which the other minor islands are connected to.  One contention 
for the term “main” is that it is not clearly stated what the term really meant.  The 
second requirement is the water to land ratio that is pegged at 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.  This 
second requirement has caused many States from claiming archipelagic status. 
 
3.3   Legal Principle and Practical Method in the Maritime Delimitation Process 
How should a nation determine what is the most equitable means of 
achieving a maritime delimitation with a neighboring state? The history of maritime 
boundary law is marked by two conflicting trends. The first seeks a synthesis of legal 
principle and practical method that would provide a clear, conclusive, and equitable 
rule for the delimitation of overlapping or converging maritime claims. The second 
denies the possibility of any such synthesis and insists that the only equitable rule is 
one that allows virtually absolute freedom of method.108  The move to freedom of 
method in the judicial decisions in the treaty law has produced a legal situation that 
was aptly described in the following terms in the Joint Separate Opinion of Judges 
Ruda, Bedjaoui and Jimenez de Arechaga in the Libya/Malta case; 
… it has to be faced that the law governing maritime delimitations is 
still affected with a degree of indeterminacy, in the sense that the 
reasons put forward do not invariably and automatically produce a 
delimitation line. Often, even a regrettable but doubtless inevitable gap 
can be observed between the arguments expounded in a judicial 
                                                            
108 E. D. Brown, Sea-bed Energy and Minerals: The International legal Regime, Volume 1. The 
Continental Shelf, 1992, Kluwer Academic Publishers page 345. 
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decision and the concrete findings as regards the choice of delimitation 
adopted.  However well founded, the reasoning does not necessarily, 
mathematically issue in the conclusion adopted109. 
 
The challenge for any country attempting to establish any type of delimitation 
boundary is two fold, identifying legal principles that are relevant to the country’s 
specific geographical context without presuming that one particular method of 
delimitation will achieve the necessary equitable result. What needs to be stressed at 
this juncture is the fact that unilateral action cannot be taken on the part of any one 
country to delimit a maritime boundary. International Law and judicial decisions 
highlight the importance of agreement between the two parties. This concept is a 
well known fundamental norm of the law of maritime delimitation 110  and the 
Chamber in the Gulf of Maine case attempted to provide a more complete and more 
precise reformulation of this “fundamental norm”.  The chamber stated: 
What general international law prescribed in every maritime 
delimitation between neighboring States could therefore be defined as 
follows: 
(1)   No maritime delimitation between States with opposite or adjacent 
coasts may be effected unilaterally by one of those States. Such 
delimitation must be sought and effected by means of an agreement, 
following negotiations conducted in good faith and with the genuine 
intention of achieving a positive result. Where however, such 
agreement cannot be achieved, delimitation should be effected by 
recourse to a third party possessing the necessary competence. 
(2)   In either case, delimitation is to be effected by the application of 
equitable criteria and by the use of practical methods capable of 
ensuring, with regard to the geographic configuration of the area and 
other relevant circumstances, an equitable result. 
The call for agreement between the parties emphasizes the need for the 
Bahamas to identify practical methods of delineation and the application of legal 
principles which can find consensus with the U.S. delegation. The state of the law 
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and state practice as it appertains to maritime delimitation reflects the fact that for 
decision-makers, the choice of means or methods for translating the relevant 
geographical and other circumstances into a precise line is as ever, the most difficult 
issue in the law of maritime boundaries.111
                                                            
111 Ibid., p. 206. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF DELIMITATION TO ARCHIPELAGIC 
STATES AND ISSUES OF ECONOMY, SECURITY AND 
GLOBAL WARMING 
 
4. 1  The Significance of Archipelagic Baselines 
The foremost consequence of the delimitation of archipelagic baselines first 
to the State itself is the generation of archipelagic waters.  This has served to be an 
entire regime that was one of the creations of UNCLOS III.  It is may be one of the 
best examples of compromise in the Convention that emerged in the thrust to strike a 
balance between States claiming recognition of the archipelagic status and the 
traditional maritime States so opposed to the idea because it was viewed as a 
curtailment of their interest in more or less, maritime trade.  Hence, delimitation 
using archipelagic baselines will give rise to archipelagic waters which is defined in 
Article 49 as follows:  
Article 49 
Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic 
waters and of their bed and subsoil 
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic state extends to the waters 
enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 
47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or 
distance from the coast. 
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic 
waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained 
therein. 
3.  This sovereignty is exercised subject to this Part. 
4.  The regime of archipelagic sea lane passages established in this Part 
shall not in other respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters, 
including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic state of its 
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sovereignty over such waters and their air space, beds and subsoil, and 
the resources contained therein.112
 
However, this has not always been the case.  The status of the waters being 
enclosed by archipelagic baselines has been a bone of contention upon which 
opposing States have been chewing on by blocking the subject of archipelagos from 
even being tabled for discussion in the first two Conferences.  Under international 
law, prior to the conceptualization of what is now known as archipelagic waters, 
waters landward of baselines from which territorial sea is measured were internal 
waters, areas of complete state jurisdiction, where foreigners would require prior 
permission for passage or any other activity.113  With this principle of internal waters 
married to the archipelagic principle and coupled with the fact that the main 
proponents of the archipelagic theory are the two biggest archipelagos that straddles 
important trade routes, has not bode well with the opposition.  In fact, as two authors 
aptly observed: 
The history of the law of the sea has been dominated by a central 
and persistent theme, the competition between the exercise of 
governmental authority over the sea and the idea of the freedom 
of the seas. The tension between these has waxed and waned 
th[r]oughout the centuries, and has reflected the political, 
strategic and economic circumstances of each particular age. 
When one or two great commercial powers have been dominant 
or have achieved parity of power, the emphasis in practice has 
lain upon the liberty of navigation and the immunity of shipping 
from local control, in such ages the seas have been viewed more 
as strategic than economic areas of competition. When, on the 
other hand, great powers have been in decline or have been 
unable to impose their wills upon smaller states, the emphasis 
has lain upon the protection and reservation of maritime 
resources, and consequently upon the assertion of local authority 
over the sea.114
                                                            
112 Article 49, UNLCOS. 
113 Supra footnote 10 at p.112. 
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What is now reduced into Article 49 is the result of a middle ground between 
to opposing interest that does not seem to sound much of a victory by the minority 
developing States over the dominant traditional maritime States.  While formation of 
the archipelagic state in international law addresses the concern of ocean states with 
the preservation of territorial integrity and maximum control of maritime space 
falling within its baseline system, there is also an appreciation of the interests of 
maritime powers in particular the need to preserve the widest possible freedoms as it 
relates to freedom of navigation. 115   Looking profoundly into the requirements 
provided for by the provisions of UNCLOS specifically those enumerated in Article 
49 shows that only the interest of one party prevails.  This interest does not seem to 
be much of the claimants’ than that of the opposing group.   
 
4.2 The Archipelagic Sea Lanes  
The principles enshrined in the archipelagic straight baseline regime can be 
seen as a boon for small island states in so far as they may extend their maritime 
space far beyond what could have been envisioned by customary international law 
prior to UNCLOS. 116   With rights come responsibility, and article 46 artfully 
balances the rights of archipelagic states with the responsibility to ensure that its 
establishment of archipelagic straight baselines do not adversely affect the rights of 
neighboring states.117     
The balance therefore that the UNCLOS provided was the provision for 
archipelagic sea-lanes, which allows archipelagic States to exercise sovereignty over 
the archipelagic waters at the same time not denying the user States their right of 
passage through the archipelagic waters that they have been using since as maritime 
trade routes.  Article 53 of UNCLOS speaks specifically to the right of archipelagic 
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sea lanes passage. 118   Hence the principle of archipelagic sea-lanes is in fact a 
collaborative effort between the archipelagic State and the user States.  This can be 
seen in the efforts of Indonesia in identifying three of its north-south sea-lanes by 
working together with Australia and the United States to come up with one that was 
mutually acceptable to the parties involved.  Additionally there was consultation on 
the creation of regulations by which the International Maritime Organization would 
agree with the submission by archipelagic states on the establishment of archipelagic 
sea lanes.119  
 
4.3  Neighboring States and Natural Resources in the Area 
The direct impact of archipelagic status will naturally be on the states 
surrounding the claimant with the brunt of it in Southeast Asian region because it is 
the location of two of the biggest archipelagic States. Indeed the archipelagic 
principle was espoused by these same two States from the inception of the Law of 
the Sea codification.  It is therefore not surprising that other Southeast Asian states 
have displayed initial opposition to the principle.  However, after the creation of the 
ASEAN120 on 08 August 1967, the rest of the Southeast Asian States rallied behind 
Indonesia and the Philippines in a show of regional cooperation and mutual 
assistance as provided for in the Bangkok Declaration.  The regional support was not 
to be construed as a waiver to whatever overlapping or conflicting claims by the 
other States.  What the ASEAN provided for was a regional forum where agreements 
and peaceful resolution to conflicting interest were discussed internally and 
amicably.121  So for adjacent States of archipelagic claimants, UNCLOS requires that 
an archipelagic State must recognize and respect traditional fishing rights, other 
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legitimate activities as well as existing agreements.122  For that reason the Jakarta 
Treaty underscores the specific character of the provisions of the Law of the Sea 
Convention which relate to the interests of immediately adjacent neighboring states 
in areas of archipelagic waters.123
Just like in one popular movie of a comic character, it is also true with respect 
to archipelagic States that with great power comes great responsibility.  Aside from 
the responsibilities that an archipelagic State has for the other neighboring States, 
with the wider area where it is allowed to exercise sovereignty comes also the 
responsibility of managing and conserving the same including its natural resource.  
Though a blessing in the sense that it can translate to economic gain, the burden of 
making said area sustainable in view of present factors can also be taxing on the 
archipelagic State.  The responsibility of conservation and management though is 
one of the issues that was raised by States opposed to the archipelagic principle 
claiming that archipelagic States might exploit the areas under the sovereignty with 
impunity without any regard to damage it might cause to the marine environment as 
well as sustainability of the natural marine resource.  One of those who made this 
argument is the United States of America in the Gulf of Maine when it propounded 
“the principle that the delimitation should facilitate conservation and management of 
the natural resources of the area.”124  This makes the responsibility to conserve and 
manage the resources a necessity if not a requirement for delimitation.   Nevertheless 
this argument was rejected by the chamber that declared:  
It should be emphasized that these fishing aspects, and others 
relating to activities in the fields of oil exploration, scientific 
research, or common defense arrangements, may require an 
examination of valid considerations of a political and economic 
character. The Chamber is however bound by its Statute, and 
                                                            
122 Article 51, Part IV, UNCLOS 1982. 
123 Supra footnote 10 at p.161. 
124 Robert Kolb, Case Law on Equitable Maritime Delimitation, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2003, at p. 236. 
35 
required by the Parties, not to take a decision ex aequo et bono 
but to achieve a result on the basis of law. The Chamber is, 
furthermore, convinced that for the purposes of such a 
delimitation operation as is here required, international law, as 
will be shown below, does no more than lay down in general that 
equitable criteria are to be applied, criteria which are not spelled 
out but which are essentially to be determined in relation to what 
may be properly called the geographical features of the area. It 
will only be when the Chamber has, on the basis of these criteria, 
envisaged the drawing of a delimitation line that it may and 
should – still in conformity with a rule of law – bring in other 
criteria which may also be taken into account in order to be sure 
of reaching an equitable result.125
Two authors put the argument differently as shown in the following:  
 …fisheries have played an important role in a number of 
delimitation negotiations as a factor accompanying and closely 
intertwined with the settlement. In six of 134 maritime 
agreements examined in this work, there were six instances of 
state practice that suggest that fishery considerations had a direct 
influence on the actual location of the boundary line. One 
example is the 1980 Iceland-Norway fisheries agreement. Due to 
Iceland’s dependence upon fisheries and Norway’s desire to 
avoid a dispute with Iceland over capeline fishing in the area in 
question, the agreement establishes a boundary following the 200 
nautical mile limit measured from Iceland’s base points.126
This argument admits the influence that natural resource have on delimitation 
or the establishment of boundaries but it does not make it a requisite for the setting 
up of one which still differs from the argument put forth by the United States in the 
Gulf of Maine case.  In relation to this, the UNCLOS is clear in its provision127 that 
archipelagic States should respect traditional fishing rights of other States although it 
is limited only to immediately adjacent States.  The archipelagic State may either 
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respect existing agreements or enter into bilateral agreements for the regulation of 
said activities upon the request of any of the States concerned.  These agreements 
though are not transferrable nor can these be shared with a third State.128
 
4.4 Other Issues 
A tangle of claims, spreading pollution, competing demands for lucrative fish 
stocks in coastal waters and adjacent seas, growing tension between coastal nations' 
rights to these resources and those of distant-water fishermen, the prospects of a rich 
harvest of resources on the sea floor, the increased presence of maritime powers and 
the pressures of long-distance navigation and a seemingly outdated, if not inherently 
conflicting, freedom-of-the-seas doctrine - all these were threatening to transform the 
oceans into another arena for conflict and instability.129  However, in recent times the 
oceans and the seas have been seen constantly as a source for cheap transport or a 
kind of a natural security buffer as well as for economic gain through the exploitation 
of its resources. The amount of traffic and usage experienced on the seas and oceans 
have led to several contentions among neighboring or interested States.  Delimitation 
was thought to be a tool to resolve any conflicts and determine as equitably as 
possible the extent of a certain State’s boundaries.  For a long time delimitation has 
been developing as a separate subject that was thought of solely relating to boundary 
delineation.  Changes in security matters, recessions and the very recent hot topic of 
global warming have also been brewing, developing as well as studied as stand alone 
issues. On 1 November 1967, Malta's Ambassador to the United Nations, Arvid 
Pardo, asked the nations of the world to look around them and open their eyes to a 
looming conflict that could devastate the oceans, the lifeline of man's very 
survival.130
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4.4.1  Maritime Security and Safety 
As all States share in the benefits of safer and more secure oceans, they also 
share in the responsibility for addressing major threats and challenges to maritime 
security and safety.131  Crimes, its incidence and reach have not only become more 
violent but have also gone beyond borders especially in the maritime sector.  
Policing of borders has become of great importance.  Two of the foremost crimes at 
present are piracy and terrorism.   Efforts to enhance either maritime security or 
safety thus have cascading effects on the conduct and regulation of other activities in 
the oceans.132  These regimes also share the need for cooperative efforts at all levels 
to enhance their effectiveness and address new challenges.133  These threats go well 
beyond use of force, and extend to poverty, infectious disease and environmental 
degradation, internal conflicts, the spread and possible use of biological, chemical 
and nuclear (BCN) weapons, terrorism, and transnational organized crime.134  In the 
Report of the Secretary-General on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, these issues were 
discussed.  The UNCLOS has not only provided different regimes in the delimitation 
but it also set out the responsibilities of State Parties that were attached to the rights 
and powers that they were allowed to exercise within their jurisdiction.  Considering 
that the UN itself espouses peaceful settlement of disputes or conflicts of interests 
hence the UNCLOS also espouses the peaceful use of the seas and oceans.  Flag 
States play a particularly important role in maritime security, as they are required to 
effectively exercise jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social 
matters over ships flying their flag.135  The Convention requires the coastal states to 
adopt laws and regulations which comply with the international rules in the purpose 
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of ensuring the innocent passage of foreign vessels 136 , with respect to the 
following137: 
•  Safety of navigation; 
•  The protection of navigation and facilities; 
•  The regulation the maritime traffic; 
•  The protection of cable and pipeline; 
•  The conservation of living resource; 
•  The prevention of infringement of fisheries law and regulation 
of coastal state; 
•  The maritime scientific research and hydrographic survey; and 
•  The prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, 
immigration, or sanitary law. 
Maritime safety on the other hand is principally concerned with ensuring safety 
of life at sea, safety of navigation, and the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment.138  This responsibility is entrenched in the delimitation because States 
can only exercise control over their territories and administrative supervision over 
the other zones.   The shipping industry has a predominant role in this regard and 
many conditions must be fulfilled before a vessel can be considered safe for 
navigation: vessels must be safely constructed, regularly surveyed, appropriately 
equipped (e.g. with nautical charts and publications) and adequately manned; crew 
must be well-trained; cargo must be properly stowed; and an efficient 
communication system must be on board.139  Trade as well as economies relies in the 
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efficiency of this system so that the private and government sectors’ collaboration is 
necessary.  Efforts to improve maritime safety in this industry are particularly 
important given its significance to world trade, economic development and poverty 
alleviation.140  Safe and efficient navigation also depends on safe, secure and crime-
free navigational routes. 141   In connection therewith, Article 27 and 28 of 1982 
United Nations Convention also provides the coastal states with criminal and civil 
jurisdiction on board a foreign ship in cases: 
•  the sequences of the crime extend to the coastal states; 
•  there are request for assistance from Master of the ship or from 
a diplomatic agent of the flag state or consular officer of the flag 
state; 
•  suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic 
substances; 
•  foreign ship lying in the territorial sea or passing through the 
territorial sea after leaving internal water. 
 
4.4.2  Climate Change and Delimitation 
Equally relevant to maritime boundary issues is the increased focus of the 
world community on the global environment.142  The oceans play a fundamental role 
in the climate system, as ocean-climate coupling regulates and mitigates the 
exchange of heat, carbon and water within the Earth’s systems.143  Aside from this, 
climate change or global warming not only has an effect on the marine resources but 
                                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/general_assembly//documents/oceans_los_advance_uneditedfile.pdf 
(retrieved 30 July 2008). 
140 Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary General http://www.un.org/Depts/ 
los/general_assembly/documents/oceans_los_advance_unedited.pdf (retrieved 25 July 2008). 
141 Ibid. 
142 Supra footnote 109 at p. xxv. 
143 Report of the Secretary-General, Overview of the United Nations activities in relation to climate 
change, A/62/644. http://www.un.org/Depts/los/general_assembly// 
documents/oceans_los_advance_unedited.pdf (retrieved 17 July 2008). 
40 
its threat also lies on its ability to change the configuration of the face of the earth as 
it is known in the present world.  This effect is clearly double edge in that it has 
economic and political implications.  One of the major manifestations of climate 
change that experts give is the eventual melting of the ice in the arctic causing a 
drastic rise in the water level.  Rise in water level will cause low lying land formation 
like islands or reefs to be submerged or even the probability of the coast moving 
landwards with higher water level with the possibility of changing the base points.  
The baseline points that would be most threatened by rising sea levels includes the 
low-tide elevations (drying rocks), fringing reefs, riverbanks, and islands.144  The 
behavior of the international community in response to this development cannot 
easily be predicted, but it is likely that many states will seek to perfect their control 
over nearby ocean areas.145  In such a case what the UNCLOS sought to avoid in its 
implementation might just again resurge due to the changes that the change in 
climate will bring about.  Unsettled maritime boundaries can lead to discord, conflict, 
and poor resource and environmental management. 146   What then would be the 
chance of a State that has not delimited its boundaries?  The answer to such question 
becomes more alarming if the State in question is an archipelagic State.  
 
4.4.3  Global Economic Portents 
The world market today is at its low with the continued unprecedented rise of 
oil prices.  Predictions as to how high the price of oil will reach are heard daily on 
the news causing world wide unease.  Economics is a major factor in delimitation 
because it is one of the main considerations in the choice of base points.  This idea 
was best described in a book of Charney et al. that states, “in six of 134 maritime 
agreements examined in this work, there were six instances of state practice that 
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JUSTICE/Resources/L&D_number5.pdf (retrieved: 05 August 2008). 
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suggest that fishery considerations had a direct influence on the actual location of 
the boundary line 147 ”.  States choose the boundary lines that will logically be 
economically helpful to its citizens and even the whole country itself.  This problem 
can best be shown in the problems being experienced in the Northern Waters.  Until 
recently the economic resources of the region consisted of the minerals extracted 
from land areas – coals from Svalbard, cryolite from Greenland, for example – and 
the seemingly ample fisheries stocks in the high seas that made up most of the 
Northern Waters.148  The changing global economic status has naturally affected 
every aspect of society and continues to not only influence boundary issues but even 
motivate States to try to claim boundary lines as far off the seas as possible.  To the 
extent that resource scarcity and competition for valuable resources continue to drive 
State behavior, established maritime boundaries will serve to allocate ocean 
resources of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone.149    
Conversely, with the desire to have as much of the oceans and seas as possible 
the other problem that springs up is the economic capability of the State to exploit or 
even just explore the parts of the seas that they have claimed to be within their 
boundaries.  During the past ten years, the increase of the price of oil and natural gas 
and the advances in technology needed to extract these products from deep waters 
has prompted the extension of the search of offshore energy into the Northern 
Waters.150  In this aspect the economic capability of the State is important and would 
define whether the delimited boundary seas will work for the State or just lie as just a 
body of water over which other States do not exercise sovereignty.  In contrast, 
sometimes boundaries are chosen only for delimiting the extent of territory of a 
State, the choice was made with no economic consideration nor exploitative 
probabilities and turns out that the area is economically viable.  Such a situation does 
not pose any problem or any tension because by then the area already is within the 
                                                            
147 Ibid., at p.81. 
148 Clive Archer and David Schrivener, Northern Waters: Security and Resource Issues, London: 
Routledge, 1986 at p. 2. 
149 Supra footnote 15 at p. xxv. 
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42 
territorial boundaries of a State who clearly has the exploration and exploitation 
rights over it.  The problem arises if an area is in dispute or maritime boundaries 
have not yet been delimited.  The lack of any detailed international agreement on the 
division of the seabed between neighboring countries only begun to present problems 
with the realization that underground resources could be economically accessible.151     
The relation of maritime boundary delimitation to the concepts of security, 
safety, economics and climate change has always been in existence but not given 
much attention.  These are the elements that contributed to the need for boundary 
delimitation as well as the considerations used by States in their decisions concerning 
the extent and the base points for their boundaries.  What delimitation ultimately 
brings in light of these issues as far as the UNCLOS is concerned is the authority and 
right of the State in combating, controlling and mitigating the effects of said issues.  
Without delimited boundary lines a State might either find itself unable or without 
mandate to deal with these things or even to protect itself from its effects.  In effect, 
delimitation narrows a States responsibility within its delineated area at the same 
time it broadens the State’s rights and authority that it can exercise within the given 
area.  To some extent, delimitation has indeed equalized the opportunities and 
responsibilities of all States regardless of its size or economic and political power by 
designating to each an equitable part of the seas as part of its territory.
                                                            
151 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
STATE 1: THE INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE AS A COMPLIANT 
ARCHIPELAGIC STATE 
 
5.1 History152 and Reasons for Archipelagic Claim  
 The concept that the nation is a single entity comprised of the entirety of the 
archipelagoes, their individual islands and surrounding waters, is a core Indonesian 
belief, known as Wawasan Nusantara (archipelagic outlook).153   Indonesia is an 
archipelago of 17,508 islands (6,000 inhabited) with a coastline of 54,716 km that 
straddles the equator which is a strategic location astride or along major sea lanes 
from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean.154  It has been made of several nations 
though with a loose relationship with each other.  Two major empires have reigned 
over the general area, namely the Buddhist Kingdom of Srivijaya that flourished in 
Sumatra from the 7th to the 14th Century followed by the Hindu Kingdom of 
Majapahit that flourished in the Java region.  Soon the Dutch came and replaced the 
existing small kingdoms that followed after the Majapahit Empire and held almost all 
of Indonesia under one colonial rule for 300 hundred years.  The colonialization by 
the Dutch actually greatly contributed to making Indonesia into one cohesive 
political entity, except for East Timor that was under Portugal.  The physical 
boundaries of Indonesia were established by the Netherlands when they took over the 
many islands and made them into a single colony: the Netherlands East Indies.155   
Indonesia as the fourth biggest country in the world with islands strung across 
the equator that are joined by waters covers an area as wide as Europe or the United 
                                                            
152 All facts and figures were taken form the United States Department of State site on Indonesia, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2748.htm#history (retrieved 03 August 2008). 
153 Indonesian Archipelagic Sealane, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 16, Sea Power Centre 
Australia, http://www.navy.gov.au/spc/maritimepapers/piama16/lanes.html (retrieved 08 Aug 2008). 
154 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/id.html (retrieved 08 August 2008). 
155 Adrian Vickers, History of Modern Indonesia, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005 at p.2. 
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States.156  This makes Indonesia the world’s largest archipelago to form a single 
State and one of the two ardent proponents for the archipelagic principle in the Law 
of the Sea Conferences.  The journey for proper recognition of the unique 
geographical configuration of Indonesia as an archipelagic State started before 
UNCLOS I convened in 1958.  It was the first to make legal unilateral claim by 
issuing Ministerial Decree of 13 December 1957, also known as the “Djuanda 
Declaration”, which regarded an archipelago as a single unit, and considered the 
water between and around the island as an integral whole area with the land 
territory.157  The Djuanda Declaration used words bearing a striking similarity to the 
1955 and 1956 Notes Verbale of the Philippines. 158   Indonesia also joined the 
Philippines in the bid to have the archipelagic principle tabled for discussion in the 
two preceding Conferences until it finally got acknowledged during UNCLOS III, 
where a separate archipelagic regime was created.   
The evolution into a sovereign statehood of Indonesia has clearly been made 
difficult by its physical configuration.  A single state with vast stretches of seas in 
between its numerous islands that are populated by heterogeneous groups of people, 
it has to make use of any means to maintain unity within itself.  As a new nation it 
has struggled to balance the interest of different groups and maintain coherence 
against both the pressures of its own diversity and tensions created by international 
politics. 159   This is why it has been fervently pushing for the inclusion in the 
UNCLOS provisions on archipelagos because it has seen that archipelagic principle 
meets its need of maintaining the territorial integrity of its State.  Basically, the claim 
for special treatment and unitization for archipelagic States stems from the greater 
difficulties they face when compared to continental States, with regard to 
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157 Supra footnote 43 at p. 6. 
158 Supra footnote 10 at p. 64. 
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communications, national cohesiveness, security, and the financial burden of 
administration.160   
 
5.2 Process of Delimitation 
 The Republic of Indonesia first saw light on August 17, 1945, when its 
independence was proclaimed just days after the Japanese surrender to the Allies.161   
The infant republic was soon faced with military threats to its very existence.162  This 
political instability was due to the presence of the Dutch who have not relinquished 
their hold over the State despite the declaration of independence, the adoption of a 
constitution and the establishment of a cabinet.  Perhaps due to the political 
instability that the war was causing and its desire to solidify and unify all islands into 
one State, the archipelagic principle looked like one of the solution for the 
beleaguered State.  Right after the end of the Second World War, new States were 
just finding their identities as well as exerting their existence in the international 
community.  On September 28, 1950, Indonesia became a member of the United 
Nations.163
 In the first legal unilateral claim made, Indonesia issued Ministerial Decree of 
13 December 1957, also known as the Djuanda Declaration that regarded an 
archipelago as a single unit, and considered the water between and around the islands 
as an integral whole area with the land territory. 164   This Declaration clearly 
formulated its espousal of the archipelagic concept by declaring that:  
…all waters surrounding, between and connecting the islands 
constituting the Indonesian State, regardless of their extension and 
breadth are integral parts of the territory of the Indonesian State and 
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therefore parts of the internal or national waters which are under the 
exclusive sovereignty of the Indonesian State. 
Innocent passage for foreign ships in these internal waters is granted 
so long as it is not prejudicial to or violates the sovereignty and 
security of Indonesia. 
The delimitation of the territorial sea (the breadth of which is 12 
miles) is measured from the baselines connecting the outermost points 
of the islands of Indonesia…165  
The basis for the claims especially on the status of the seas between and around 
islands situated together as an archipelago was from the decision of the International 
Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case that considered the waters 
between islands in an archipelago as internal waters.  During the First Geneva 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, the Indonesian delegate, Subarjo, explained his 
country’s unilateral legal action with regard to the archipelagic concept as follows:166  
Indonesia consists of some 13,000 islands scattered over a vast area.  
To treat them as separate entities each with its own territorial waters, 
would create many serious problems. Apart from the fact that the 
exercise of state jurisdiction in such an area was a matter of great 
difficulty, there was the question of the maintenance of 
communication between the islands. 
If each of Indonesia’s component islands were to have its own 
territorial sea, the exercise of more effective control would be made 
extremely difficult. 
Furthermore, in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, the use of the 
modern means of destruction in the interjacent waters would have 
disastrous effect on the population of the islands and on the living 
resources of the maritime areas concerned.  That is why the 
Indonesian government believes that the seas between and around the 
islands should be considered as forming a whole with the land 
territory, and the country’s territorial seas should be measured from 
baselines drawn between the outermost points of the outermost 
islands.167  
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  Such formal enactment of legislation pertaining to the archipelago concept in 
Indonesia, was the consequence of the failure of the 1958 and 1960 Conferences of 
the Law of the Sea to provide a special regime for archipelago.  In 1960, the Djuanda 
Declaration was formally ratified by Indonesia.  Its archipelagic baselines were 
drawn in 1960 and continental shelf boundaries have been negotiated with Malaysia 
in 1969 and with Australia in April 1971. 168   Hence during the UNCLOS III, 
Indonesia together with other archipelagic States moved for the acceptance and 
inclusion of provisions relating to archipelagos.  This time the proponents of the 
archipelagic doctrine were successful, as the adopted UNCLOS provides for the 
special regime of archipelagos. 
 Following the adoption of the UNCLOS, Indonesia as signatory, ratified the 
Convention on 03 February 1986.169  Then it issued Act No. 6 of 08 August 1996, 
the Act on Indonesian Waters.  Article 2 of the Act states: 
Article 2170
1. The State of the Republic of Indonesia is an archipelago. 
2. All waters in the surroundings, in between and those which connect 
the islands or part of the islands included in the land area of the State 
of the Republic of Indonesia, without regard to the extent and width 
thereof, constitute an integral part of the territories of the land area of 
the State of the Republic of Indonesian waters existing under the 
sovereignty of the State of the Republic of Indonesia.171
 
 The passage of Act No. 6 made Indonesia’s declaration as an archipelagic 
State official as far as UNCLOS is concerned.  This was Indonesia’s first step in the 
                                                            
168 Supra footnote 109 at p. 1456.  
169 Table recapitulating the status of the Convention and of the related Agreements, as at 16 July 2008, 
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process of incorporating its claims vis-à-vis the provisions of UNCLOS.  Article 5 of 
Act No. 6 provides for straight baselines as the baseline of choice for the Indonesian 
Archipelago and affirms that such baselines have to be measured from the low-water 
line of the outermost islands and dry rocks of Indonesia as provided for in Part IV of 
the UNCLOS.172  The Indonesian baseline is defined in Governmental Regulation 
No. 38, 2002, where the list of coordinates of 183 base points used to construct 
Indonesian baselines are also provided for.173  In addition, it undertook verification 
of its islands which including the naming of the islands that were still nameless.  This 
process was the result of Indonesia’s decision to register its islands with the UN in 
preparation of its submission.  Notwithstanding numbering, the naming of these 
islands is really about strategy for Indonesia.  This is considered the first important 
step in developing and maintaining small islands.  While this is important for 
economic development, it has an even more significant impact on national 
sovereignty.174
     On 16 June 2008, the Republic of Indonesia submitted to the Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf, in accordance with Article 76, paragraph 8, of 
the Convention, information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured relating to the continental shelf of North West of Sumatra Island.175  This 
submission though is not complete and Indonesia has already informed CLCS that it 
will be submitting another partial submission before the deadline of May 2009.  
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Partial submission process that was used by Indonesia is based on the decision of the 
CLCS that provided for the “submission of preliminary information that was only 
indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles”.176  
The consideration of the submission made by Indonesia will be included in the 
provisional agenda of the twenty-third session of the Commission to be held in New 
York in March-April 2009. 177   The Executive Summary of the submission of 
Indonesia is published in the Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea site in 
accordance to the rule of procedure of the Commission.178
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CHAPTER 6 
 
STATE 2:  THE PHILIPPINES AS AN ARCHIPELAGIC STATE 
AND ITS STATUS IN THE PROCESS OF COMPLIANCE 
 
6.1  Historical179 Basis of the Philippine Claim 
The Philippines, like its neighbour Indonesia was made up of island 
communities that were governed by local chiefs called datu or rajah.  These 
communities were related with one another by trade, consanguinity or affinity of the 
ruling chiefs but all the islands that are part of the present Philippines did not belong 
to one chief ruler or one central government.  They were just groups of island 
communities sharing several commonalities in features, language, belief system and 
customs.  They might have gone together into war to protect their respective 
territories and rights but not as belonging to one entity or state.  The idea of 
nationhood arose with the advent of colonization.  The first to colonize the islands, 
and eventually gave these islands the name Philippines, was Spain.  The Spanish rule 
lasted for over three hundred years of continuous occupancy until local insurrection 
as well as wars faced by Spain with other colonial powers (e.g. the United States) led 
to the cession of the Philippines.  Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United 
States in the Treaty of Paris of 10 December 1898.  In this Treaty Spain actually sold 
the Philippines to the US for 20 million dollars.180  However, this Treaty was the first 
document where the expanse of the Philippine territory was described.  Article III of 
the Treaty of Paris states the following:  
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Article III. 
Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the 
Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the 
following line:  
A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth 
parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable 
channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the 
one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude 
east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty seventh 
(127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel 
of four degrees and forty five minutes (4 [degree symbol] 45']) north 
latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty five 
minutes (4 [degree symbol] 45') north latitude to its intersection with 
the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty 
five minutes (119 [degree symbol] 35') east of Greenwich, thence 
along the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and 
thirty five minutes (119 [degree symbol] 35') east of Greenwich to the 
parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7 [degree symbol] 
40') north, thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees and 
forty minutes (7 [degree symbol] 40') north to its intersection with the 
one hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east of 
Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th) 
degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth 
(118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence 
along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of 
longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning.  The United 
States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000) 
within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the 
present treaty.181
From this point onward the description stated in Article III of the Treaty of 
Paris has been the extent of what became to be considered as the territory of the 
Philippines.  Before even the advent of the Conventions creating the different 
regimes, the Philippines treated the area described in Article III of the Treaty of Paris 
as comprising its territory.  This is evinced by the statement of Article I on The 
National Territory of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, which states: 
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ARTICLE I 
The National Territory 
 Section 1.  The Philippines comprises all the territory ceded to the 
United States by the Treaty of Paris concluded between the United 
States and Spain on the tenth day of December, eighteen hundred 
and ninety-eight, the limits which are set forth in Article III of said 
treaty, together with all the islands embraced in the treaty 
concluded at Washington between the United States and Spain on 
the seventh day of November, nineteen hundred, and the treaty 
concluded between the United States and Great Britain on the 
second day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty, and all 
territory over which the present Government of the Philippine 
Islands exercises jurisdiction.182
 The adoption of the Philippines of the Treaty of Paris area predates any 
international convention and it was enjoyed as such by the State.  Noteworthy is the 
fact that the 1935 Constitution was enacted at the time that the Philippines was still 
under the rule of the United States as a Commonwealth.  Thus the passage of this 
fundamental law was sanctioned by the United States through its President to whom 
the draft Constitution was submitted for approval by the Constitutional 
Convention.183   The Philippines eventually gained full independence on 04 July 
1946.   
 In 1951 the International Court of Justice decided upon a dispute between the 
United Kingdom and Norway that came to be known as the Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries Case.  In essence, the decision basically said that the straight baselines 
drawn along the outer coastlines between fixed base points on the mainland itself or 
on the innumerable islands, islets or skerries forming the Norwegian skaergaard, 
thus including inside the base lines the waters of all the Norwegian fjords and sounds 
formed by the mainland and/or the skaergaard was not contrary to the principles of 
                                                            
182 The 1935 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. 
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international law.184  The decision also stated that the waters within the straight 
baselines are considered to be internal waters.  This decision churned the first move 
of the Philippines’ claim for recognition as an archipelagic State.   
 Influenced by the Anglo-Norwegian Case decision, the Philippines in a note 
verbale to the UN Secretary-General stated: 
All waters around, between and connecting the different islands belonging to the 
Philippine Archipelago irrespective of their widths or dimensions, are necessary 
appurtenances of its land territory, forming an integral part of the national or 
inland waters subject to the exclusive sovereignty of the Philippines.’185   All 
other water areas are embraced within the lines described in the Treaty of Paris of 
18 December 1898, the Treaty concluded at Washington D.C. between the 
United States and Spain on 7 November 1900, the Agreement between the 
United States and the United Kingdom of 2 January 1930 and the Convention of 
6 July 1932 between the United Sates and Great Britain as reproduced in section 
6 of the Commonwealth Act.186
 The Philippines based this claim on “historical grounds” maintaining that the 
Philippines have viewed all the islands as one unit and so has Spain as a colonizer.  
The Treaty of Paris is a further evidence of this assertion.  However, this opposed 
declaration met opposition from other States, one of which, ironically, was the US.   
 
6.2 Philippines in the Law of the Sea Conferences 
 The Philippines did not stop with the note verbale to the UN Secretary-
General.  When UNCLOS I convened in 1958 in Geneva to examine the Law of the 
Sea, there was a preparatory document prepared by Mr. Jens Evensen, advocate in 
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the Supreme Court of Norway, at the request of the United Nations Secretariat made 
conclusion on mid-ocean archipelagos along the following lines:187
i) Though a state must be allowed the latitude necessary in order to 
be able to adopt the delimitation of the territorial sea of its midocean 
archipelagos to practical needs and local requirements, such 
delimitation has international law aspects. 
 
ii)  The close dependence of the territorial sea upon the local domain 
of the archipelago will always be paramount importance. 
 
iii) The drawing of baselines must not depart appreciably from the 
general direction of the coast of the archipelago viewed as a whole. 
 
iv) Although there was no fixed maximum as to the length of 
baselines, the drawing of exorbitantly long baselines, closing vast areas 
of sea to free navigation and fishing would be contrary to international 
law.  In such cases, there could not be a sufficiently close dependence 
between the land domain and the water areas concerned. 
 
v) The question as to whether the waters situated between and inside 
the constituent parts of an archipelago may be considered as internal 
waters would depend upon whether such areas are so closely linked to 
the surrounding land domain of the archipelago as to be treated in the 
same manner as the surrounding land. 
 
vi) The waters situated between and inside the islands and islets of an 
archipelago shall be considered as internal waters and where such 
waters form a strait, such waters cannot be closed to the innocent 
passage of foreign ships.188 
 
However, the Philippines have also submitted at the start of the Conference a 
proposal that it sought to have inserted as part of draft Article 5, a new paragraph 
which states: 
When islands lying off the coast are sufficiently close to one another as 
form a compact whole and have been historically considered 
collectively as a single unit, they may be taken in their totality and the 
method of straight baselines provided in Article 5 may be applied to 
determine their territorial sea.  The baseline shall be drawn along the 
coast of the outermost islands, following the general configuration of 
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the group.  The waters inside such lines shall be considered internal 
waters.189
Nevertheless, the proposal as well as the efforts of the Philippines to table the 
issue on archipelagos for discussion was unsuccessful.  UNCLOS I, though 
successful in drafting four conventions overlooked the issue on archipelagos because 
it had difficulty in reaching an agreement among the members on the breadth of the 
territorial sea.  The same thing happened during UNCLOS II that convened in 1960 
as the same problem on the breadth of the territorial and the contiguous zone was 
carried over and took all the time and consideration of the Conference.190   
  
6.3 Problems on the Philippine Claim 
 As previously stated the archipelagic States’ struggle for the proper 
recognition in the international forum of their status and unique requirements met 
much resistance.  Starting from the note verbale, the only positive actions that were 
made were mostly unilateral at most and therefore not binding internationally or on 
any State.  In 1955 Indonesia issued Djuanda Declaration, which was the first 
unilateral legal act by an archipelagic State.  The Philippines on its part already had 
its territory described in its Constitution that was enacted in 1935.  The point from 
which the Philippines was arguing its case was not only from the view of “territorial 
integrity” or the islands forming a “single unit” but that these two reasons were being 
claimed on the basis of “historical grounds”.  The principle of “historic waters”, 
invoked in support of the argument for special treatment was because historically the 
islands of the archipelago were treated and regarded as a unit, was the underlying 
argument brought by the Philippines in its efforts to have the subject on archipelago 
be discussed during UNCLOS I.191  Failing to consider the issue of archipelagos, 
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UNCLOS I postponed it because it was thought to be too complex for solution.192  
This explains in part why the Philippines did not sign the four Geneva Conventions 
adopted in 1958.193
  At the Second United Nations Law of the Sea Conference in 1960, the 
Philippines, now joined by Indonesia, maintained their claim for unitisation. 194   
However, UNCLOS II again failed to take action on the proposals of the Philippines 
and Indonesia 195  even when the Philippines called for a special solution to the 
problem. 196   Following the disappointment that the Philippines encountered, the 
Philippines instead turned internally.  Formal enactment of legislation pertaining to 
the archipelago concept was instead adopted as a consequence of the failure of the 
1958 and 1960 Conferences on the Law of the Sea. 197   On 17 June 1961, the 
Philippines enacted an Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the 
Philippines which states that:198
… all waters within the Treaty Limits have always been regarded 
as part of the territory of the Philippine Islands: all water around, 
between and connecting the various islands of the Philippine 
archipelago, irrespective of their width or dimension, forming 
part of the inland or internal waters of the Philippines; therefore 
all the waters beyond the outermost islands of the archipelago 
connected by straight baselines but within the Treaty Limits 
comprise the Territorial Waters of the Philippines.199
 This law, later amended in 1968, provides for baselines from which the 
territorial sea of the Philippines is determined to consist of 79 straight lines joining 
80 designated points on the outermost islands of the archipelago.200  Following the 
enactment of R.A. No. 3046, the Philippines received protests from the United 
                                                            
192 Supra footnote 9 at p. 206. 
193 Supra footnote 43 at p. 13. 
194 Supra footnote 105 at p.124. 
195 Supra footnote 9. 
196 Supra footnote 105 at p.133. 
197 Supra footnote 10 at p.65. 
198 Supra footnote 43. 
199 Republic Act No. 3046 of 1961, otherwise known as “An Act to Define the Baselines of the 
Territorial Sea of the Philippines.” 
200 Supra footnote 43. 
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States, the United Kingdom and Australia expressing the concern of these States 
about the passage through the archipelagic waters, particularly with reference to 
warships.201  Nevertheless, before the very first session of UNCLOS III in December 
1973, the Philippines in 17 January 1973 ratified a new Constitution that contained 
the following Article containing its claim to the Treaty Limits stating: 
 
ARTICLE I 
The National Territory 
 
Section 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, 
with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all the other 
territories belonging to the Philippines by historic or legal title, 
including the territorial sea, the air space, the subsoil, the sea-bed, the 
insular shelves, and the submarine areas over which the Philippines has 
sovereignty or jurisdiction. The waters around, between, and 
connecting the islands of the archipelago, irrespective of their breadth 
and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.202
 
 Subsequently, after the enactment of local laws emphasising its territorial 
claims, the Philippines once again turned its attention to the international level where 
together with other archipelagic nations, they continued their struggle for recognition 
at the UNCLOS III.  Nonetheless, the Philippines had to contend with protests that 
ironically were made by the US, who was one of the parties of the Treaty of Paris.  
Basically, what the US was claiming was that the description in the Treaty of Paris 
sketched only the land territory and was not meant to be construed as to include the 
seas around and between the islands.  As a counter argument, the Filipino delegate, 
Ambassador Arturo Tolentino made the following statement at the Summer Session 
of the U.N. Sea-Bed Committee in Geneva in 1973, saying: 
Mr. Chairman, I know the United States adheres to the three-mile limit 
of the territorial sea.  But in connection with the statement of the 
distinguished delegate of the United States that the Treaty of Paris 
                                                            
201 Supra footnote 10 at p.64. 
202 Article I, The 1973 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. 
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between Spain and the United States in 1898 did not transfer any 
waters but only the land area, I ask: Why were the boundaries made on 
the waters and far away from land, 270 miles away towards the pacific 
and 147 miles towards the China Sea? 
Then, consider these points: 
(1) The Fisheries Act of 1932, passed by the Philippine Legislature, 
stated that the territorial sea of the Philippines extended to the Treaty 
Limits.  We were then still under the United States and the American 
Governor-General, representing American sovereignty in the 
Philippines, approved and signed that law. 
 
(2) In 1935, the Constitution of the Philippines was submitted to the 
President of the United States for approval.  Its very first article 
described Philippine territory as extending to the Treaty Limits.  The 
President of the United States approved and signed that Constitution. 
 
(3) When the Philippines was still under American sovereignty there 
maps published by agencies of the United States government indicating 
these Treaty Limits as the boundaries of the Philippines. 
It may be very convenient now for the United States to say that she did 
not exercise sovereignty over the territorial sea of the Philippines 
because she is no longer there.203
 
In UNCLOS III, the archipelagic States eventually gained the recognition they 
had been fighting for in the previous Conferences.  Finally, with modification, the 
UNCLOS provides for archipelagic baselines producing a new regime called 
archipelagic waters which describes the waters landwards that are enclosed by 
archipelagic baselines.  Notwithstanding this seeming victory, the Philippine claim 
based on the Treaty of Paris is still not tenable within the requirements provided in 
the UNCLOS.  Thus, as far as the water to land ratio then the Philippines very much 
qualifies but using the Treaty Limits baselines and claiming waters enclosed within 
those baselines are internal waters and basing such claim on “historic grounds” was 
not accepted.  Another criterion in Article 47 is that the length of the baseline may 
not exceed 100 miles except that up to three percent of the total number of baselines 
may be drawn to a maximum length of 125 miles.  Out of the 79 identified straight 
                                                            
203 Supra footnote 43 at pp. 13-14. 
59 
lines of the Philippines, two measured beyond the 125 miles maximum with the 
longest measuring up to 140.05 miles.204  
 
6.4  Status of Philippine Boundary Delimitation 
 Interestingly, the Philippines was one of the States that signed the UNCLOS 
on 10 December 1982, which was the first day the Convention was opened for 
signature.   On 8 May 1984, the Philippines became the first State in the Southeast 
Asian region to ratify the Convention and the tenth State among all the signatories.205    
Since the issuance of R.A. No. 3046 outlining the Philippine baselines, which was 
pre-UNCLOS, there has been no new law that sets out baselines in accordance with 
the Convention.  The lack of priority of baselines delimitation within the 
Government of the Philippines was exacerbated by political instability.  Just two 
years after the Philippines ratified the Convention, the first of a series of “bloodless 
revolution” was mounted to depose the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1986.  
Several revolutions followed but only one other successfully removed a President, 
the actor Joseph Estrada.   
 It was only in 1993 that the issue on delimitation was revived within the 
Government through a bill dealing with baseline delimitation sponsored by Senator 
Leticia Ramos-Shahani. 206   Senator Shahani herself several years after her 
sponsoring of the bill admitted that it was because the bill was full of loopholes and 
problems that made the bill unsuccessful.  From then on several proposals have been 
filed concerning delimitation in both chambers of Congress but not one has been 
successful enough to be passed into law.  On 27 February 2008, a news item in 
Manila Standard, a nationally circulated broadsheet warned that the Philippines was 
on the verge of losing the Spratlys or the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), which is 
                                                            
204 Supra footnote 7 at p.154. 
205 Ibid., p.6. 
206 Vera Files, “Arroyo Neglect, Gov't Infighting Jeopardize RP's Territorial Claim”, http:// 
www.gmanews.tv/story/85939/Arroyo-neglect-govt-infighting-jeopardize-RPs-territorial-claim    
(retrieved 15 May 2008). 
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one of the contested areas of the Philippines.  The other claimants for this area are: 
Malaysia, Taiwan, China, Brunei, and Vietnam. 
 HB 3216, the seeking to delimit the Philippine boundaries authored by three 
representatives has already passed a second reading in December 2007. 207   It 
proposes to include even disputed areas in the drawing of baselines.  In a note to the 
Philippine Embassy, China expressed objection to HB 3216 stating that China was 
shocked by and gravely concerned with the negative development and request 
clarification from the Philippine side.208  This lead some groups to call for changes in 
HB 3216 and deleting provisions that provides for the inclusion of disputed areas in 
the delimitation of boundaries.  Different arguments have then surfaced forcing the 
passing of HB 3216 to be stalled.  One school of thought stated that the Philippine 
Congress can not pass a law delimiting the Philippine baselines in accordance with 
UNCLOS because it will be unconstitutional.  The present Constitution of the 
Philippines ratified in 1987 states: 
ARTICLE I 
National Territory 
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the 
islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over 
which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its 
terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the 
seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The 
waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the 
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part 
of the internal waters of the Philippines.209
 The language of Article I of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines bears a 
marked difference from the two previous Constitutions in that it does no longer state 
the Treaty of Paris, especially the description stated in its Article III as the basis of it 
                                                            
207 Press Releases, “Baselines Issue Should Unite Not Divide: Nograles, Congress of the Philippines, 
House of Representatives,” http://www.congress.gov.ph/press/details.php?pressid=2233 (retrieved 9 
June 2008). 
208 “China Opposes RP Archipelagic Bill,” Sun Star Network Online, March 13, 2008, http: 
//www.sunstar.com.ph/static/net/2008/03/13/china.opposes.rp.archipelagic.baseline.bill.html 
(retrieved 3 July 2008). 
209 Article I, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines. 
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its definition of the Philippine territory.  However, Article I of the present 
Constitution claims that the waters around, between and connecting the islands of the 
archipelago form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. 210   This is in 
contradiction with the provisions of UNCLOS which states that the waters enclosed 
by archipelagic baselines shall be archipelagic waters which have different attributes 
from internal waters.211   This actually is a mistake that can be attributed to the 
Philippines because the present Constitution was ratified after the Philippines signed 
and ratified the UNCLOS.  Hence as signatory the Philippines was duty bound to 
draft its laws in accordance with its existing obligations in the international 
community.  In other words, the language or the way that the 1987 Philippine 
Constitution was written was not in accordance with the provisions of UNCLOS.  
However, government officials, lawyers and common Filipinos alike felt strongly 
about its claim over parts of the sea which are considered forming part of the 
Philippines territory based on “historical grounds”. 
 Another contentious issue is the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal because it 
has divided lawmakers and officials from the executive branch into different sides as 
to how it should be properly dealt with.  This led the executive branch to issue four 
options, which are: 
Option 1. Enclose the main archipelago and Scarborough Shoal only 
while the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) is treated as a regime of 
islands under Article 121 of UNCLOS. 
 
Option 2. Enclose the main archipelago then treat Scarborough Shoal 
and KIG as regimes of islands. 
 
Option 3. Enclose the main archipelago and KIG then treat 
Scarborough Shoal as a regime of islands. 
 
                                                            
210 Ibid. 
211 Article 49, UNCLOS 1982. 
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Option 4. Enclose all three--the main archipelago, KIG and 
Scarborough Shoal.212
  
This is a source of disagreement because aside from the mentioned objections 
made by China, lawmakers themselves can not seem to come into agreement as to 
what will be most beneficial to the Philippines.213  Consequently,  due to difference 
of opinion and a lot of in fighting and power struggle, HB 3216 is on hold though 
officially Congress claims that it is due to the fact that the bill is currently being 
consolidated with that of the Senate which also deals with the same issue of baseline 
delimitation. 
                                                            
212 Vera Files, Palace, Lawmakers Eye Four Baselines Options, http://www.verafiles.org/index. 
php/focus/34-top-story/70-palace-lawmakers-eye-four-baseline-options (retrieved 25 June 2008). 
213 Asian Journal Online, “Don’t Include Kalayaan Group of Islands in Baselines Bill”,  7 August 
2008,  http://asianjournal.com/?c=186&a=29364 (retrieved 10 August 2008). 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In determining the extent of a coastal State’s territorial sea and other 
maritime zones, it is obviously necessary first of all to establish from what points on 
the coast the outer limits of such zones are to be measured – this is the function of 
baselines.214  One of the reasons why the UNCLOS underwent a total of 24 years in 
the making was because, like people, States want to be treated differently from each 
other.  Obviously no two coastlines are the same and considering that the land 
configuration around the world is so diverse, enacting one law that covers all the 
quirks and uniqueness of each State was a daunting task.  Add to this milieu the 
special concern of archipelagos seeking recognition of their particular status and the 
archipelagos are sitting in the middle of important maritime trade routes.  The result 
is either chaos or like the UNCLOS experience, a very long waiting before finally 
being adopted.    
UNCLOS consolidated the existing maritime zonal regimes stated in separate 
conventions plus the new regime of archipelagos.  All these are dependent on the 
delimitation of the baselines, which serve as a starting point of the delimitation of 
maritime zones along a coast to close off internal waters of the coastal State 
concerned.215  Article 47(1) provides that “an archipelagic State may draw straight 
archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and 
drying reefs of the archipelago”.216  However, this seemingly free rein to extend the 
territory is limited by the criteria the UNCLOS provided. 
                                                            
214 Supra footnote 32 at p. 31. 
215 Supra footnote 7 at p.13. 
216 Supra footnote 32 at p.123. 
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It has been 26 years since the adoption of the UNCLOS in 1982 and just less 
than a year away from the deadline for submission, some of the signatories have yet 
to delimit their baselines.  Looking back in the history of UNCLOS, the two fervent 
proponents of the archipelagic principle were the Philippines and Indonesia.  Hence 
it is deemed interesting to revisit these two States and assess whether they retained 
their zeal in their efforts to comply with the provisions of UNCLOS.   
On 16 June 2008, Indonesia had already submitted to the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf, information on the limits of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines.  Indonesia is still preparing other 
partial submissions that it is trying to submit before the deadline in May.  Despite 
any internal problems, Indonesia was able to pull itself by the “bootstrap” to meet its 
international obligation.  Unfortunately, the Philippines have not reached this level. 
As the second largest archipelago, the Philippines have been very vigilant in 
the time prior to and during the Conferences in campaigning for the archipelagic 
principle.  It has argued well and long and was eventually paid off when provisions 
dealing with archipelagos were inserted in the Convention.  The Philippines has been 
the first in its promotion of the archipelagic principle but has failed in the application 
part.  With just months from the deadline, internal conflict and partisan politics still 
affect its ability to comply within the period allocated to member States wherein to 
comply.  The law delimiting the Philippine baselines is still being hotly debated in 
Congress while the disputed areas or the contentious areas like the KIG and the 
Scarborough Shoal are being snapped up by the other claimants who are already in 
the process of submitting or are more powerful militarily than the Philippines.  
Losing sovereignty over the disputed area does not only mean that the Philippine 
territory is reduced, but also the fact that these losses will mean fewer sources of 
marine resources.  Another contributory reason for the delay is the stubbornness of 
the Philippines to maintain the Treaty Limits claim even when it has already signed 
and ratified the UNCLOS.  The Philippines should instead concentrate on how to re-
65 
draw the line that exceeds the UNCLOS’ requirement of a maximum of 125 nautical 
miles. 
If the Philippine Government will just keep its acts together and try to come up with 
the all important baselines law that will be its basis for its compliance to the 
submission to the CLCS then it may beat the 13 May 2008 deadline.  Like Indonesia, 
the Philippines can make submission based on Paragraph 1(a) of the Decision of the 
CLCS as stated in SPLOS/183 dated 20 June 2008 made during the 18th meeting of 
States Parties in New York from 13-20 June 2008.217  The decision to relax the 
requirement relating to submission is because the Commission recognizes that some 
coastal States, in particular developing countries, including small island developing 
States, continue to face particular challenges in submitting information to the 
Commission in accordance with Article 76 due to a lack of financial and technical 
resources and relevant capacity and expertise, or other similar constraints.218
At this point in time, States like the Philippines has no other recourse but to 
work on the delimitation of their boundaries before 13 May 2009.  A request for the 
extension of the deadline is not an assurance that the date will indeed be extended.  
Non-compliance on the other hand will only be detrimental to States like the 
Philippines as it will not only mean losing much more of the disputed islands and 
islets but also compromising the State’s territorial integrity and put into question its 
credibility as a responsible member of the community of nations.   
                                                            
217  Decision regarding the workload of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and the 
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APPENDICES
Appendix A.  Treaty of Paris  
 
Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Spain; December 10, 1898 
The United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, in the 
name of her august son Don Alfonso XIII, desiring to end the state of war now 
existing between the two countries, have for that purpose appointed as 
plenipotentiaries: 
The President of the United States, William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. 
Frye, George Gray, and Whitelaw Reid, citizens of the United States; 
And Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, 
Don Eugenio Montero Rios, president of the senate, Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza, 
senator of the Kingdom and ex-minister of the Crown; Don Jose de Garnica, deputy 
of the Cortes and associate justice of the supreme court; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de 
Villa-Urrutia, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at Brussels, and Don 
Rafael Cerero, general of division; 
Who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their full powers, which 
were found to be in due and proper form, have, after discussion of the matters before 
them, agreed upon the following articles: 
Article I. Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. And as 
the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the 
United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the 
obligations that may under international law result from the fact of its occupation, for 
the protection of life and property. 
Article II. Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands 
now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the 
Marianas or Ladrones. 
Article III. Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine 
Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line: 
A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth 
parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable 
channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to 
the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of 
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longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and 
twenty seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of 
Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes 
(4 [degree symbol] 45']) north latitude, thence along the parallel 
of four degrees and forty five minutes (4 [degree symbol] 45') 
north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude 
one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty five minutes (119 
[degree symbol] 35') east of Greenwich, thence along the 
meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and 
thirty five minutes (119 [degree symbol] 35') east of Greenwich 
to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7 
[degree symbol] 40') north, thence along the parallel of latitude 
of seven degrees and forty minutes (7 [degree symbol] 40') north 
to its intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth (116th) 
degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a 
direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of 
north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) 
degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence 
along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of 
longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning. The 
United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars 
($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the 
ratifications of the present treaty. 
Article IV. The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the 
exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and 
merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and 
merchandise of the United States. 
Article V. The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send back 
to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the capture 
of Manila by the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be 
restored to them. 
Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, proceed to 
evacuate the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on terms similar to those 
agreed upon by the Commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacuation of Porto 
Rico and other islands in the West Indies, under the Protocol of August 12, 1898, 
which is to continue in force till its provisions are completely executed. 
The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands and Guam shall be 
completed shall be fixed by the two Governments. Stands of colors, uncaptured war 
vessels, small arms, guns of all calibres, with their carriages and accessories, powder, 
ammunition, livestock, and materials and supplies of all kinds, belonging to the land 
and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the property of Spain. 
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Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast 
defences, shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six months, to be 
reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the treaty; and the United States may, 
in the meantime, purchase such material from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement 
between the two Governments on the subject shall be reached. 
Article VI. Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisoners 
of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned for political offences, in connection 
with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with the United States. 
Reciprocally, the United States will release all persons made prisoners of war by the 
American forces, and will undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in 
the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines. 
The Government of the United States will at its own cost return to Spain and the 
Government of Spain will at its own cost return to the United States, Cuba, Porto 
Rico, and the Philippines, according to the situation of their respective homes, 
prisoners released or caused to be released by them, respectively, under this article. 
Article VII. The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for 
indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either Government, or of its 
citizens or subjects, against the other Government, that may have arisen since the 
beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifications 
of the present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of the war. 
The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain 
relinquished in this article. 
Article VIII. In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III of this treaty, 
Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico and other islands in the West 
Indies, in the island of Guam, and in the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings, 
wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways and other immovable property 
which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain, and as such belong to 
the Crown of Spain. 
And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to 
which the preceding paragraph refers, can not in any respect impair the property or 
rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of 
provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic 
bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess 
property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of 
whatsoever nationality such individuals may be. 
The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, includes all documents 
exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that may exist in the 
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archives of the Peninsula. Where any document in such archives only in part relates 
to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished whenever it shall be 
requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain in respect of 
documents in the archives of the islands above referred to. 
In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are also included such 
rights as the Crown of Spain and its authorities possess in respect of the official 
archives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the islands above referred to, 
which relate to said islands or the rights and property of their inhabitants. Such 
archives and records shall be carefully preserved, and private persons shall without 
distinction have the right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of 
the contracts, wills and other instruments forming part of notorial protocols or files, 
or which may be contained in the executive or judicial archives, be the latter in Spain 
or in the islands aforesaid. 
Article IX. Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over 
which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain 
in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of 
property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and 
they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce and professions, 
being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In 
case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of 
Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the 
exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve 
such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced 
it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside. 
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby 
ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress. 
Article X. The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes 
her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion. 
Article XI. The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty 
cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters civil as well as 
criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they reside, pursuant 
to the ordinary laws governing the same; and they shall have the right to appear 
before such courts, and to pursue the same course as citizens of the country to which 
the courts belong. 
Article XII. Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of ratifications 
of this treaty in the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty 
shall be determined according to the following rules: 
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1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private 
individuals, or in criminal matters, before the date mentioned, 
and with respect to which there is no recourse or right of review 
under the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be final, and shall be 
executed in due form by competent authority in the territory 
within which such judgments should be carried out.  
2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the date 
mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment 
before the court in which they may then be pending or in the 
court that may be substituted therefor.  
3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the 
Supreme Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which by 
this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its 
jurisdiction until final judgment; but, such judgment having been 
rendered, the execution thereof shall be committed to the 
competent authority of the place in which the case arose.  
Article XIII. The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by 
Spaniards in the Island of Cuba and in Porto Rico, the Philippines and other ceded 
territories, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall continue 
to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary and artistic works, not subversive of 
public order in the territories in question, shall continue to be admitted free of duty 
into such territories, for the period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the 
exchange of the ratifications of this treaty. 
Article XIV. Spain will have the power to establish consular officers in the ports and 
places of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either relinquished or 
ceded by the present treaty. 
Article XV. The Government of each country will, for the term of ten years, accord 
to the merchant vessels of the other country the same treatment in respect of all port 
charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage duties, as it 
accords to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the coastwise trade. 
Article XVI. It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by the 
United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy thereof; 
but it will upon termination of such occupancy, advise any Government established 
in the island to assume the same obligations. 
Article XVII. The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United 
States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty 
the Queen Regent of Spain; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington 
within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible. 
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In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty and 
have hereunto affixed our seals. 
Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year of Our Lord one 
thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight. 
[Seal] William R. Day  
[Seal] Cushman K. Davis  
[Seal] William P. Frye  
[Seal] Geo. Gray[Seal] Whitelaw Reid  
[Seal] Eugenio Montero Rios  
[Seal] B. de Abarzuza 
[Seal] J. de Garnica  
[Seal] W. R. de Villa Urrutia  
[Seal] Rafael Cerero 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77 
Appendix B.  Republic Act. No. 3046 
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Appendix C.  Republic Act No. 5446 
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Appendix D.  Presidential Proclamation No. 370 
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Appendix E.  Presidential Decree No. 1599 
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Appendix F.  Flowchart of the Procedures Concerning a Submission 
made to the Commission by Indonesia 
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Appendix G.  Executive Summary, Continental Shelf Submission of 
Indonesia 
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Appendix H.  Maps 
 
 
Figure 1 - Maritime boundaries and disputed areas along the Asian Rim 
in     the Pacific Ocean 
Source:   Prescott, V. and Schofield, C., The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, 
2nd Edition, Leiden, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005 
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Figure 2 - South-East Asian Marine Regions 
Source:   Kattichaisaree, K., The Law of the Sea and Maritime Boundary Delimitation in 
South-East Asia, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987 
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Figure 3 - Archipelagic Baselines I 
Source:   Prescott, V. and Schofield, C., The Maritime Political Boundaries of the 
World, 2nd Edition, Leiden, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005 
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Figure 4 - Archipelagic Baselines II 
Source:   Prescott, V. and Schofield, C., The Maritime Political Boundaries of the 
World, 2nd Edition, Leiden, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005 
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Figure 5 - South-East Asian Archipelagos and Major Shipping Routes 
Source:   Kattichaisaree, K., The Law of the Sea and Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
in South-East Asia, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987 
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Figure 6 - Indonesia’s Maritime Jurisdictional Regimes (Claims as of July 1982) 
Source:   Kattichaisaree, K., The Law of the Sea and Maritime Boundary 
Delimitation in South-East Asia, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987 
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Figure 7 - The Indonesian Archipelago 
Source:   Kattichaisaree, K., The Law of the Sea and Maritime Boundary 
Delimitation in South-East Asia, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987 
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Figure 8 – Indonesian Map:  Agreed and Pending Maritime Boundaries with 
Neighboring States 
Source:  Arsana, I Made Andi, The Deliniation of Indonesia’s Outer Limits of Its 
Extended Continental Shelf and Preparation for its Submission:  Status and 
Problems, United Nations, 2007 
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Figure 9 - The Straight Baseline of the Philippines 
Source:   Prescott, V. and Schofield, C., The Maritime Political Boundaries of the 
World, 2nd Edition, Leiden, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005 
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Figure 10 - Occupied Spratly Islands 
Source:   Prescott, V. and Schofield, C., The Maritime Political Boundaries of the 
World, 2nd Edition, Leiden, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005 
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Figure 11 - Potential marine area attached to the Spratly Islands 
Source:   Prescott, V. and Schofield, C., The Maritime Political Boundaries of the 
World, 2nd Edition, Leiden, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005 
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